From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes
Cambridge University Press, 2020
Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions series
Cover design by: Jamie Douglas
This book examines the creation and consequences of executive constraints in authoritarian regimes. How do some dictatorships become institutionalized ruled-based systems, while others remain heavily personalist? Once implemented, do executive constraints actually play an effective role in promoting autocratic stability? To understand patterns of regime institutionalization, I study the emergence of constitutional term limits and succession procedures, as well as elite power-sharing within presidential cabinets. This project employs a wide range of evidence, including an original time-series dataset of 46 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1960 to 2010, formal theory, and case studies. Altogether this book paints a picture of how some dictatorships evolve from personalist strongman rule to institutionalized regimes.
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Table of Contents
Chapter 1 Introduction
Chapter 2 Why do leaders institutionalize?
Chapter 3 Two Illustrative Cases
Chapter 4 How should institutionalization be measured?
Chapter 5 What are the causes of regime institutionalization?
Chapter 6 What are the consequences of institutionalization on autocratic durability?
Chapter 7 What are the consequences of institutionalization on leadership succession?
Chapter 8 Conclusion