Anne Meng

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Constraining Dictatorship
From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes

Cambridge University Press, 2020
Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions series

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Cover design by: Jamie Douglas
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This book examines the creation and consequences of executive constraints in authoritarian regimes. How do some dictatorships become institutionalized ruled-based systems, while others remain heavily personalist? Once implemented, do executive constraints actually play an effective role in promoting autocratic stability? To understand patterns of regime institutionalization, I study the emergence of constitutional term limits and succession procedures, as well as elite power-sharing within presidential cabinets. This project employs a wide range of evidence, including an original time-series dataset of 46 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1960 to 2010, formal theory, and case studies. Altogether this book paints a picture of how some dictatorships evolve from personalist strongman rule to institutionalized regimes. 

Buy it from Amazon here or from Cambridge University Press here!

Awards and honors: 
  • 2021 APSA William H. Riker Prize for the best book on political economy published during the past three years 
  • Named one of the Best Books of 2021 by Foreign Affairs
Reviewed in:​
  • Author exchange with Ken Opalo in the APSA Democracy and Autocracy newsletter 
  • Democratization
  • ​Foreign Affairs 
  • Governance
  • International Public Management Review
  • Perspectives on Politics​
  • Political Science Quarterly
  • The Journal of Modern African Studies
Featured in:
  • New Books Network podcast
  • Scope Conditions podcast
  • Ufahamu Africa podcast 
  • UW Political Economy Forum podcast