Anne Meng

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Constraining Dictatorship
From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes

Cambridge University Press, 2020
Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions series

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Cover design by: Jamie Douglas
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This book examines the creation and consequences of executive constraints in authoritarian regimes. How do some dictatorships become institutionalized ruled-based systems, while others remain heavily personalist? Once implemented, do executive constraints actually play an effective role in promoting autocratic stability? To understand patterns of regime institutionalization, I study the emergence of constitutional term limits and succession procedures, as well as elite power-sharing within presidential cabinets. This project employs a wide range of evidence, including an original time-series dataset of 46 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1960 to 2010, formal theory, and case studies. Altogether this book paints a picture of how some dictatorships evolve from personalist strongman rule to institutionalized regimes. 

Buy it from Amazon here or from Cambridge University Press here!

Named one of the Best Books of 2021 by Foreign Affairs 

Awards: 
  • 2021 APSA William H. Riker Prize for the best book on political economy published during the past three years 
Reviewed in:​
  • Author exchange with Ken Opalo in the APSA Democracy and Autocracy newsletter 
  • Democratization
  • ​Foreign Affairs 
  • Governance
  • International Public Management Review
  • Perspectives on Politics​
  • Political Science Quarterly
  • The Journal of Modern African Studies
Featured in:
  • New Books Network podcast
  • Scope Conditions podcast
  • Ufahamu Africa podcast 
  • UW Political Economy Forum podcast