Constraining Dictatorship
From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes
(under contract with Cambridge University Press: Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions series)
This book examines the creation and consequences of executive constraints in authoritarian regimes. How do some dictatorships become institutionalized ruled-based systems, while others remain heavily personalist? Once implemented, do executive constraints actually play an effective role in promoting autocratic stability? To understand patterns of regime institutionalization, I study the emergence of constitutional term limits and succession procedures, as well as elite power-sharing within presidential cabinets. This project employs a wide range of evidence, including an original time-series dataset of 46 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1960 to 2010, formal theory, and case studies. Altogether this book paints a picture of how some dictatorships evolve from personalist strongman rule to institutionalized regimes.
The first half of the book examines the conditions under which credible executive constraints arise. I argue that institutions credibly constrain leaders only when they change the underlying distribution of power between leaders and elites, and this can be done by providing elites with access to the state. Leaders institutionalize their regimes only when they enter power weak vis-à-vis other elites and susceptible to being deposed. For such weak leaders, the only way to remain in power is to create institutional mechanisms to share power and benefits with other elites through constitutional rules and cabinet appointments. The second half of the book examines the consequences of regime institutionalization. I demonstrate that weak leaders who institutionalize are less likely to face coup attempts and are able to remain in office for longer periods of time, compared with weak leaders who do not institutionalize. I also show that regimes that have constitutional succession rules and designated successors are more likely to undergo peaceful leadership transitions. These results suggest that formal rules in dictatorships do indeed matter for regime stability and are not simply instances of window-dressing.
Download the full Table of Contents and Chapter 1: Introduction here.
The first half of the book examines the conditions under which credible executive constraints arise. I argue that institutions credibly constrain leaders only when they change the underlying distribution of power between leaders and elites, and this can be done by providing elites with access to the state. Leaders institutionalize their regimes only when they enter power weak vis-à-vis other elites and susceptible to being deposed. For such weak leaders, the only way to remain in power is to create institutional mechanisms to share power and benefits with other elites through constitutional rules and cabinet appointments. The second half of the book examines the consequences of regime institutionalization. I demonstrate that weak leaders who institutionalize are less likely to face coup attempts and are able to remain in office for longer periods of time, compared with weak leaders who do not institutionalize. I also show that regimes that have constitutional succession rules and designated successors are more likely to undergo peaceful leadership transitions. These results suggest that formal rules in dictatorships do indeed matter for regime stability and are not simply instances of window-dressing.
Download the full Table of Contents and Chapter 1: Introduction here.
Table of Contents
Chapter 1 Introduction
Chapter 2 Why do leaders institutionalize?
Chapter 3 Two Illustrative Cases
Chapter 4 How should institutionalization be measured?
Chapter 5 What are the causes of regime institutionalization?
Chapter 6 What are the consequences of institutionalization on autocratic durability?
Chapter 7 What are the consequences of institutionalization on leadership succession?
Chapter 8 Conclusion
Chapter 2 Why do leaders institutionalize?
Chapter 3 Two Illustrative Cases
Chapter 4 How should institutionalization be measured?
Chapter 5 What are the causes of regime institutionalization?
Chapter 6 What are the consequences of institutionalization on autocratic durability?
Chapter 7 What are the consequences of institutionalization on leadership succession?
Chapter 8 Conclusion