Tying the Big Man's Hands
From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes
This book examines the creation and consequences of executive constraints in authoritarian regimes. To do so, I focus on the concept of autocratic regime institutionalization - the creation of rules and procedures that tie the leader's hands. Rather than assume that institutions, such as parties or legislatures, always constrain autocrats, this book examines the creation of explicit executive constraints within constitutions and presidential cabinets.
How can authoritarian regimes become institutionalized, such that the regime does not depend on any particular set of leaders to survive? How does a dictatorship evolve from a government run by "big men" to a system run by rules?
I examine these questions using new data on constitutional constraints of executive power, such as term limits and presidential succession policies, as well as informal methods of power-sharing within presidential cabinets in Sub-Saharan Africa. I argue that leaders who enter office initially weak must pursue the counter-intuitive strategy of committing to give power away in order to buy support from other elites. Such measures are most likely persist when they empower other elites by providing them access to the state, therefore reducing the costs of collective action. This initial period of weakness, however, ties the autocrat's hands in the long run, as institutions gain stability over time. Initially self-interested actions ultimately generate stable power-sharing arrangements that facilitate peaceful leadership succession, setting the stage for durable authoritarian rule.
This project employs a wide range of evidence, including an original dataset of 47 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1960-2010, formal theory, and case studies. Altogether, this book aims to paint a picture of how some dictatorships evolve from personalist strongman rule to institutionalized regimes.
Feel free to email me for drafts of chapters.
How can authoritarian regimes become institutionalized, such that the regime does not depend on any particular set of leaders to survive? How does a dictatorship evolve from a government run by "big men" to a system run by rules?
I examine these questions using new data on constitutional constraints of executive power, such as term limits and presidential succession policies, as well as informal methods of power-sharing within presidential cabinets in Sub-Saharan Africa. I argue that leaders who enter office initially weak must pursue the counter-intuitive strategy of committing to give power away in order to buy support from other elites. Such measures are most likely persist when they empower other elites by providing them access to the state, therefore reducing the costs of collective action. This initial period of weakness, however, ties the autocrat's hands in the long run, as institutions gain stability over time. Initially self-interested actions ultimately generate stable power-sharing arrangements that facilitate peaceful leadership succession, setting the stage for durable authoritarian rule.
This project employs a wide range of evidence, including an original dataset of 47 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1960-2010, formal theory, and case studies. Altogether, this book aims to paint a picture of how some dictatorships evolve from personalist strongman rule to institutionalized regimes.
Feel free to email me for drafts of chapters.
Table of Contents
Chapter 1 Introduction
Chapter 2 Presidents and Power in Sub-Sharan Africa
Chapter 3 Why Do Leaders Institutionalize?
Chapter 4 How Should Institutionalization be Measured?
Chapter 5 Causes of Regime Institutionalization
Chapter 6 Consequences of Regime Institutionalization - Leader Tenure and Succession
Chapter 7 Consequences of Regime Institutionalization - Regime Longevity and Coup Risks
Chapter 8 Conclusion
Chapter 2 Presidents and Power in Sub-Sharan Africa
Chapter 3 Why Do Leaders Institutionalize?
Chapter 4 How Should Institutionalization be Measured?
Chapter 5 Causes of Regime Institutionalization
Chapter 6 Consequences of Regime Institutionalization - Leader Tenure and Succession
Chapter 7 Consequences of Regime Institutionalization - Regime Longevity and Coup Risks
Chapter 8 Conclusion
