Constraining Dictatorship
From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes
(Forthcoming with Cambridge University Press: Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions series)

​This book examines the creation and consequences of executive constraints in authoritarian regimes. How do some dictatorships become institutionalized ruled-based systems, while others remain heavily personalist? Once implemented, do executive constraints actually play an effective role in promoting autocratic stability? To understand patterns of regime institutionalization, I study the emergence of constitutional term limits and succession procedures, as well as elite power-sharing within presidential cabinets. This project employs a wide range of evidence, including an original time-series dataset of 46 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1960 to 2010, formal theory, and case studies. Altogether this book paints a picture of how some dictatorships evolve from personalist strongman rule to institutionalized regimes. 

Download the full Table of Contents and Chapter 1: Introduction here!

Table of Contents

Chapter 1     Introduction

Chapter 2     Why do leaders institutionalize?

Chapter 3     Two Illustrative Cases

Chapter 4     How should institutionalization be measured?

Chapter 5     What are the causes of regime institutionalization? 

Chapter 6     What are the consequences of institutionalization on autocratic durability?

Chapter 7     What are the consequences of institutionalization on leadership succession?

Chapter 8     Conclusion