From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes
Cambridge University Press, 2020
Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions series
This book examines the creation and consequences of executive constraints in authoritarian regimes. How do some dictatorships become institutionalized ruled-based systems, while others remain heavily personalist? Once implemented, do executive constraints actually play an effective role in promoting autocratic stability? To understand patterns of regime institutionalization, I study the emergence of constitutional term limits and succession procedures, as well as elite power-sharing within presidential cabinets. This project employs a wide range of evidence, including an original time-series dataset of 46 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1960 to 2010, formal theory, and case studies. Altogether this book paints a picture of how some dictatorships evolve from personalist strongman rule to institutionalized regimes.
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Reviewed in: Foreign Affairs
Podcast discussion: Ufahamu Africa
Table of Contents
Chapter 1 Introduction
Chapter 2 Why do leaders institutionalize?
Chapter 3 Two Illustrative Cases
Chapter 4 How should institutionalization be measured?
Chapter 5 What are the causes of regime institutionalization?
Chapter 6 What are the consequences of institutionalization on autocratic durability?
Chapter 7 What are the consequences of institutionalization on leadership succession?
Chapter 8 Conclusion