

# **Winning the Game of Thrones: Leadership Succession in Modern Autocracies**

**Anne Meng**

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Appendix Table 1: Constitutional Succession Rules

<b>Country</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Designated successor</b>
Angola	1992-2009	President of National Assembly
	2010-2017	Vice President
Botswana	1969-2018	Vice President
Burkina Faso	1977-1980	Prime Minister
	1991-2014	President of Senate
Burundi	1981-1986	Vice President
	1992-1996	President of National Assembly
Cameroon	1962-1971	Vice President
	1972-1975	President of National Assembly
	1975-1995	Prime Minister
CAR	1986-2002	President of National Assembly
	2005-2013	President of National Assembly
Comoros	1985-1992	President of Supreme Court
	2001-2010	Vice President
Republic of Congo	1961-1963	Vice President
DRC	2003-2019	President of Senate
Cote d'Ivoire	1976-1981	President of National Assembly
	1982-1985	Vice President
	1986-1999	President of National Assembly
Equatorial Guinea	1968-1972	Vice President
Gabon	1961-1974	Vice President
Gambia	1997-2016	Vice President
Ghana	1969-1972	President (“Speaker”) of the National Assembly
Guinea	1990-2008	President of the National Assembly
Guinea-Bissau	1981-1996	Vice President
Kenya	1963-1978	Vice President
Liberia	1944-1979	Vice President
	1986-2003	Vice President
Mali	1974-1990	President of National Assembly
Mauritania	1991-2004	President of Senate
Mozambique	1990-2015	President of National Assembly
Namibia	1990-2015	Prime Minister
Niger	1989-2009	President of National Assembly
Nigeria	1963-1966	President of Senate
	1979-1984	Vice President
	1993-1998	Vice President
Rwanda	1961-1973	Vice President
	1991-1994	Secretary General of ruling party
Senegal	1960-1975	President of National Assembly
	1976-1980	Prime Minister
Sierra Leone	1978-1991	Vice President
South Africa	1994-2018	Vice President (“Deputy President”)
Sudan	1973-1985	Vice President

	1998-2019	Vice President
Tanzania	1977-2015	Vice President
Togo	1992-2004	President of National Assembly
Zambia	1964-1972	Vice President
	1973-1991	Secretary General of ruling party
	1991-2008	Vice President

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Note: The constitutional succession rules listed in this table include only the time period that is reflected in the dataset. For example, the succession rules that were introduced in Angola in 2010 are still in place today, but they are listed as “ending” in 2017 in this table, because the leader observations for Angola end in 2017. Succession rules were introduced into the Liberian constitution in 1847, but the rule is listed as “beginning” in 1944 in this table because that’s when the leader enters this dataset (earlier leaders are not included). Sometimes the vice president position is referred to as the “prime minister”, and there are a very small number of observations in my sample in which the “prime minister” is identified as the formal successor. It is important to note that in the African context the difference between a vice president and prime minister is in name only – these two offices are functionally equivalent, and countries *either* have a vice president *or* a prime minister, but not both. Due to these reasons, I consider succession rules that name the prime minister a de facto vice president succession rule. However, in my empirical analysis I include a robustness check that drops the prime minister observations.

Appendix Table 2: Distribution of Designated Successors

Designated Successor	Country-Year Observations
Vice President	409 (61%)
President of National Assembly	175 (26%)
President of Senate	55 (8%)
Other	28 (5%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>667</b>

Note: “Other” includes President of Supreme Court and Secretary General of ruling party. Sometimes the vice president position is referred to as the “prime minister”, and there are a very small number of observations in my sample in which the “prime minister” is identified as the formal successor. It is important to note that in the African context the difference between a vice president and prime minister is in name only – these two offices are functionally equivalent, and countries *either* have a vice president *or* a prime minister, but not both. Due to these reasons, I consider succession rules that name the prime minister a de facto vice president succession rule. However, in my empirical analysis I include a robustness check that drops the prime minister observations.

Appendix Table 3: List of leaders included in this study

<b>Country</b>	<b>Leader name</b>	<b>Years in power</b>
Angola	Antonio Agostinho Neto	1975-1979
Angola	Jose Eduardo dos Santos	1979-2017
Benin	Hubert Maga	1960-1963
Botswana	Seretse Khama	1966-1980
Botswana	Quett Masire	1980-1998
Botswana	Festus Mogae	1998-2008
Botswana	Seretse Khama Ian Khama	2008-2018
Burkina Faso	Maurice Yameogo	1960-1966
Burkina Faso	Sangoule Lamizana	1966-1980
Burkina Faso	Thomas Sankara	1983-1987
Burkina Faso	Blaise Compaore	1987-2014
Burundi	Michel Micombero	1966-1976
Burundi	Jean-Baptiste Bagaza	1976-1987
Burundi	Pierre Buyoya	1987-1993
Burundi	Pierre Buyoya	1996-2003
Cameroon	Ahmadou Ahidjo	1960-1982
CAR	David Dacko	1960-1966
CAR	Jean-Bedel Bokassa	1966-1979
CAR	Andre Kolingba	1981-1993
CAR	Ange-Felix Patasse	1993-2003
CAR	Francois Bozize	2003-2013
Chad	Francois Tombalbaye	1960-1975
Chad	Felix Malloum	1975-1979
Chad	Goukouni Oueddei	1979-1982
Chad	Hissene Habre	1982-1990
Comoros	Said Mohamed Djohar	1990-1995
Comoros	Assoumani Azali	1999-2006
Comoros	Ahmed Abdallah Sambi	2006-2011
Congo DRC	Joseph Kasavubu	1960-1965
Congo DRC	Mobutu Banga	1965-1997
Congo DRC	Laurent-Desire Kabila	1997-2001
Congo DRC	Joseph Kabila	2001-2019
Republic of Congo	Abbe Fulbert Youlou	1960-1963
Republic of Congo	Alphonse Massamba-Debat	1963-1968
Republic of Congo	Marien Ngouabi	1969-1977
Republic of Congo	Denis Sassou-Nguesso	1979-1992
Republic of Congo	Pascal Lissouba	1992-1997
Cote d'Ivoire	Felix Houphouet-Boigny	1960-1993
Cote d'Ivoire	Henri Konan Bedie	1993-1999
Cote d'Ivoire	Laurent Gbagbo	2000-2011
Djibouti	Hassan Gouled Aptidon	1977-1999
Equatorial Guinea	Francisco Macias Nguema	1968-1979
Ethiopia	Tafari Bante	1974-1977

Ethiopia	Mengistu Haile Mariam	1977-1991
Ethiopia	Meles Zenawi	1991-2012
Gabon	Leon M'Ba	1961-1967
Gabon	El Hadj Omar Bongo	1967-1967
Gambia	Dawda Jawara	1970-1994
Gambia	Yahya Jammeh	1996-2017
Ghana	Kwame Nkrumah	1960-1966
Ghana	J.A. Ankraah	1966-1969
Ghana	I.K. Acheampong	1972-1978
Guinea	Ahmed Sekou Toure	1958-1984
Guinea	Lansana Conte	1984-2008
Guinea Bissau	Luis De Almeida Cabral	1973-1980
Guinea Bissau	Joao Bernardo Vieira	1980-1999
Guinea Bissau	Kumba Yala	2000-2003
Guinea Bissau	Joao Bernardo Vieira	2005-2009
Kenya	Jomo Kenyatta	1963-1978
Liberia	William Tubman	1944-1971
Liberia	William Tolbert	1971-1980
Liberia	Samuel Doe	1980-1990
Liberia	Amos Sawyer	1990-1994
Liberia	Charles Taylor	1997-2003
Madagascar	Philibert Tsiranana	1959-1972
Madagascar	Gabriel Ramanantsoa	1972-1975
Mali	Modibo Keita	1960-1968
Mali	Moussa Traore	1968-1991
Mauritania	Moktar Ould Daddah	1960-1978
Mauritania	Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla	1980-1984
Mauritania	Maawiya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya	1984-2005
Mozambique	Samora Moises Machel	1975-1986
Mozambique	Joaquim Alberto Chissano	1986-2005
Mozambique	Armando Emilio Guebuza	2005-2015
Namibia	Samuel Daniel Nujoma	1990-2005
Namibia	Hifikepunye Pohamba	2005-2015
Niger	Hamani Diori	1960-1974
Niger	Seyni Kountche	1974-1987
Niger	Ali Saibou	1987-1993
Niger	Mahamane Ousmane	1993-1996
Niger	Ibrahim Bare Mainassara	1996-1999
Niger	Mamadou Tandja	1999-2010
Nigeria	Abubakah Tafawa Balewa	1960-1966
Nigeria	Yakubu Gowon	1966-1975
Nigeria	Olusegun Obasanjo	1976-1979
Nigeria	Alhaji Shehu Shagari	1979-1983
Nigeria	Ibrahim Babangida	1985-1993
Nigeria	Sani Abacha	1993-1998
Rwanda	Gregoire Kayibanda	1962-1973

Rwanda	Juvenal Habyarimana	1973-1994
Rwanda	Pasteur Bizimungu	1994-2000
Senegal	Leopold-Sedar Senghor	1960-1980
Sierra Leone	Milton Margai	1958-1964
Sierra Leone	Albert Michael Margai	1964-1967
Sierra Leone	Siaka Probyn Stevens	1968-1985
Sierra Leone	Joseph Saidu Momoh	1985-1992
Sierra Leone	Valentine Strasser	1992-1996
Somalia	Aden Abdullah Osman	1960-1967
Somalia	Mohamed Siad Barre	1969-1991
South Africa	Nelson Rolihla Mandela	1994-1999
South Africa	Thabo Mbeki	1999-2008
South Africa	Jacob Zuma	2009-2018
Sudan	Ibrahim Abboud	1958-1964
Sudan	Ismail Al-Azhari	1965-1969
Sudan	Gaafar Mohamed Nimeiry	1971-1985
Sudan	Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir	1989-2019
Tanzania	Julius Kambarage Nyerere	1963-1985
Tanzania	Ali Hassan Mwinyi	1985-1995
Tanzania	Benjamin William Mkapa	1995-2005
Tanzania	Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete	2005-2015
Togo	Sylvanus Olympio	1960-1963
Togo	Nicolas Grunitzky	1963-1967
Togo	Gnassingbe Eyadema	1967-2005
Uganda	Milton Obote	1962-1971
Uganda	Idi Amin	1971-1979
Uganda	Milton Obote	1980-1985
Zambia	Kenneth David Kaunda	1964-1991
Zambia	Frederick Chiluba	1991-2002
Zambia	Levy Patrick Mwanawasa	2002-2008
Zimbabwe	Robert Mugabe	1980-2017

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Appendix Table 4: Transition Outcomes and Constitutional Rules

	VP rule	Other rule	No rule	Total
Transition Peaceful	23 (70%)	4 (12%)	6 (18%)	33
Transition Not Peaceful	13 (15%)	13 (15%)	60 (70%)	86
Total	36	17	86	119

Note: Percentage of outcomes with that particular institution presented in parentheses under the count. For example, 70 percent of peaceful transitions had a VP rule.



Appendix Table 5: Leader deposal, disaggregated by type (robustness check)

DV: Incumbent deposed	(1) Coup	(2) External challenge	(3) Coup	(4) External challenge	(5) Coup	(6) External challenge
Succession rule	-1.769*** (0.493)	-1.929** (0.589)	-1.568** (0.530)	-1.871** (0.629)	-1.073* (0.535)	-0.981 (0.852)
Constitution			0.355 (1.167)	1.779 (1.557)	0.059 (1.141)	1.315 (1.447)
Ruling party			-1.676 (1.223)	-3.127** (1.048)	-1.446 (1.340)	-3.498** (1.154)
Leader duration			-0.053 (0.029)	-0.005 (0.033)	-0.056 (0.034)	0.005 (0.039)
GDP per capita					-0.370* (0.166)	-2.444** (0.902)
Oil production					-0.479* (0.200)	1.052** (0.392)
Population					-0.198 (0.178)	-0.427 (0.227)
Ethnic frac					0.342 (1.272)	-1.422 (1.848)
British					0.054 (0.690)	-0.361 (0.827)
French					0.725 (0.653)	-0.065 (0.949)
Constant	0.750** (0.280)	-0.268 (0.394)	2.522 (1.488)	0.883 (1.885)	4.230 (2.518)	8.111* (3.332)
Observations	119	119	119	119	114	114
Pseudo R2	-1.769***	-1.929**	-1.568**	-1.871**	-1.073*	-0.981

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Multinomial logit used in all models.

“External challenge” consists of popular uprisings and removal by rebel group.

\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

Appendix Table 6: Ordinary Least Squares (robustness check)

DV: Transition peaceful	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Succession rule	0.419*** (0.098)		0.377*** (0.100)		0.267** (0.088)	
VP rule		0.548*** (0.106)		0.513*** (0.117)		0.370** (0.134)
Other rule		0.144 (0.128)		0.065 (0.109)		0.084 (0.137)
Constitution			-0.067 (0.114)	-0.057 (0.114)	-0.043 (0.126)	-0.084 (0.129)
Ruling party			0.064 (0.095)	0.037 (0.091)	0.042 (0.075)	0.042 (0.072)
Leader duration			0.010 (0.006)	0.012* (0.005)	0.009 (0.005)	0.010 (0.005)
GDP per capita					0.108*** (0.022)	0.098*** (0.025)
Oil production					-0.019 (0.027)	-0.026 (0.027)
Population					0.022 (0.039)	0.036 (0.039)
Ethnic frac					0.163 (0.126)	0.169 (0.126)
Cold War					0.093 (0.072)	0.046 (0.078)
British					-0.111 (0.166)	-0.149 (0.163)
French					-0.157 (0.121)	-0.097 (0.155)
Constant	0.091* (0.037)	0.091* (0.037)	-0.001 (0.136)	-0.010 (0.140)	-0.364 (0.408)	-0.429 (0.403)
Observations	119	119	119	119	114	114
R-Squared	0.216	0.295	0.255	0.350	0.462	0.489

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. OLS regression used in all models.

\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

Appendix Table 7: Vague Succession Rules (robustness check)

DV: Transition peaceful	(1)	(2)
Succession rule	4.197*	3.627^
	(1.886)	(2.176)
Vague succession rule	2.809	2.657
	(1.867)	(2.129)
Constitution	-2.241	-2.113
	(1.750)	(1.798)
Ruling party	1.202	0.020
	(0.972)	(0.718)
Leader duration	0.045	0.071
	(0.029)	(0.049)
GDP per capita		1.885*
		(0.783)
Oil production		-1.031
		(0.581)
Population		0.476
		(0.449)
Ethnic frac		2.738
		(2.358)
Cold War		0.653
		(0.646)
British		-1.459
		(1.208)
French		-1.786
		(1.031)
Constant	-3.717**	-10.424*
	(1.183)	(4.233)
Observations	119	114
Pseudo R2	0.279	0.514

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The variable *Vague Succession Rule* takes a value of 1 if a constitutional succession rule exists but does not clearly identify *who* the successor should be. 18 percent of cases have a vague succession rule. Logistic regression used in all models.

\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, ^p<0.10

Appendix Table 8: Global Sample

DV: Transition peaceful	(1)	(3)
Ruling party	-0.223 (0.203)	-0.123 (0.293)
Family ties	-0.075 (0.366)	-0.056 (0.481)
Constant	0.149 (0.185)	0.061 (0.146)
Observations	393	313
Pseudo R-squared	0.0019	0.0695
Country FE	No	Yes

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Logistic regression used in all models. This global sample includes all authoritarian regimes from 1946-2008 (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010). \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

Appendix Table 9: Excluding designated successor with short appointment spells

DV: Transition peaceful	(1)	(2)	(3)
VP rule	2.982*** (0.536)	2.944*** (0.671)	1.764* (0.830)
Other rule	1.506 (0.784)	0.818 (0.895)	1.133 (0.938)
Constitution		-0.344 (1.043)	-0.580 (1.531)
Ruling party		0.300 (0.997)	0.092 (0.822)
Leader duration		0.071* (0.035)	0.068 (0.046)
GDP per capita			1.988* (0.895)
Oil production			-1.230 (0.712)
Population			0.378 (0.322)
Ethnic frac			3.602 (2.952)
Cold War			0.285 (0.633)
British			-1.595 (1.327)
French			-1.501 (1.011)
Constant	-2.065*** (0.406)	-2.874 (1.517)	-9.389* (4.272)
Observations	119	119	114
Pseudo R2	0.258	0.304	0.480

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Logistic regression used in all models. VP rule and Other rule are coded as 1 only if the designated successor held the position for 3 or more years before the leadership transition.  
 \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

A critical aspect of my theory is that material resources allow designated successors who are VPs to consolidate their authority before the leadership transition. Therefore we may be concerned that designated successors who were VP for only a very short period of time may not have been able to shore up their support base sufficiently prior to the leadership transition. To address this, I create an alternate version of the *VP rule* variable that takes a value of 1 only if the designated successor held the VP position for *three or more years* before the leadership transition. For consistency, I also create an alternate version of the *Other rule* coded the same way. I rerun the analysis using these versions of the *VP rule* and *Other rule* that excludes designated successor with very short appointment spells.

Appendix Table 10: Sample limited to observations with constitutions (robustness check)

DV: Transition peaceful	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Succession rule	2.399*** (0.525)		1.759** (0.629)	
VP rule		2.931*** (0.605)		2.270** (0.843)
Other rule		1.182 (0.707)		0.957 (0.977)
Leader duration			0.081 (0.051)	0.089 (0.058)
GDP per capita			2.135 (1.096)	2.222 (1.267)
Oil production			-1.128 (0.776)	-1.251 (0.940)
Population			0.358 (0.387)	0.484 (0.404)
Ethnic frac			3.252 (2.529)	3.209 (2.551)
Cold War			0.385 (0.627)	0.172 (0.648)
British			-1.395 (1.056)	-1.790 (1.066)
French			-2.295* (1.064)	-1.983 (1.200)
Constant	-2.361*** (0.488)	-2.361*** (0.488)	-10.136* (4.124)	-11.313* (4.850)
Observations	111	111	106	106
Pseudo R2	0.194	0.252	0.526	0.539

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Logistic regression used in all models.

\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

We may be concerned that regimes without constitutions are cases that are extremely personalist or have particularly weak institutions. To address this, I rerun the analysis on a subset of the data that excludes observations that do *not* have constitutions (in order words, only units that have constitutions for the entire period are included in this analysis).

Appendix Table 11: Count variables (robustness check)

DV: Transition peaceful	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Succession rule	0.126*** (0.023)		0.107** (0.042)	
VP rule		0.177*** (0.041)		0.195** (0.066)
Other rule		0.053 (0.042)		0.066 (0.066)
Constitution			0.068 (0.055)	0.049 (0.057)
Ruling party			-0.017 (0.024)	-0.032 (0.020)
Leader duration			0.088 (0.046)	0.114* (0.052)
GDP per capita			1.814*** (0.547)	1.725** (0.543)
Oil production			-0.790* (0.359)	-0.739* (0.348)
Population			0.186 (0.353)	0.377 (0.499)
Ethnic frac			3.684 (3.471)	2.773 (3.269)
Cold War			2.508** (0.827)	2.122* (0.859)
British			-1.572 (1.415)	-2.644* (1.305)
French			-1.627 (1.179)	-1.527 (1.225)
Constant	-2.038*** (0.333)	-2.048*** (0.336)	-10.981** (3.364)	-11.322** (3.850)
Observations	119	119	114	114
Pseudo R2	0.252	0.310	0.550	0.575

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Logistic regression used in all models. Count version of variables used for succession rules (including VP rule and Other rule), constitution, and ruling party.

\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

We may be concerned that the binary measures of my independent variables are too coarse, and do not reflect differences in the levels of institutionalization of succession procedures. I rerun the analyses using count versions of my independent variables, rather than dummy variable versions. The count versions of the succession rule variables record the number of years the rule was in place, leading up to the leadership transition. For consistency I also use count versions of the constitution and ruling party variables.

Appendix Table 12: Cold War period (robustness check)

DV: Transition peaceful	(1)	(2)
VP rule	2.973*** (0.766)	2.677* (1.183)
Constitution		-3.335 (1.969)
Ruling party		0.560 (0.818)
Leader duration		0.235*** (0.055)
GDP per capita		2.393 (1.291)
Oil production		-0.965 (1.058)
Population		0.593 (0.587)
Ethnic frac		1.729 (2.440)
British		-3.587 (1.900)
French		-2.469 (1.577)
Constant	-2.686*** (0.616)	-9.747 (6.412)
Observations	61	60
Pseudo R2	0.280	0.523

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Logistic regression used in all models.

\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

We may be concerned that my results are being driven purely by institutions that were created after the end of the Cold War. To address this concern, I rerun the analysis on leadership transitions that occurred prior to 1992. I do not include the Other rule in these regressions because the vast majority of designated successors was the vice president during this period. It is not surprising that the president of the legislature was rarely used for the designated successor during the Cold War, as authoritarian legislatures were much less influential (or sometimes even banned) during this period.



Appendix Table 13: Excluding prime ministers

DV: Transition peaceful	(1)	(2)	(3)
VP rule	2.813*** (0.596)	2.962*** (0.785)	2.579* (1.149)
Other rule	1.124 (0.776)	0.676 (0.727)	0.897 (0.959)
Constitution		-0.493 (0.968)	-1.292 (1.399)
Ruling party		-0.208 (1.002)	-0.348 (0.804)
Leader duration		0.083* (0.036)	0.082 (0.051)
GDP per capita			1.881 (0.964)
Oil production			-1.107 (0.779)
Population			0.502 (0.374)
Ethnic frac			3.199 (2.482)
Cold War			0.168 (0.641)
British			-2.070 (1.214)
French			-1.431 (1.270)
Constant	-2.303*** (0.448)	-2.745* (1.377)	-9.596* (4.382)
Observations	115	115	110
Pseudo R2	0.234	0.299	0.490

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Logistic regression used in all models. Observations where the prime minister is the designated successor are excluded from these regressions.

\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

In some African countries, the vice president position is called a “prime minister” position, even though these regimes remain presidential systems. The office of the prime minister is equivalent to that of a vice president – the prime minister is appointed by and subordinate to the president. These cases arose infrequently; there are only four observations in my dataset where the prime minister is the designated successor. For these reasons, I coded observations where the constitutional succession rule designates the prime minister as a 1 for the *VP rule* variable. However, we may be concerned that the vice president and prime minister position are not exactly the same. To address this concern, I exclude prime minister observations in this robustness check.

Appendix Table 14: Inherited Succession Rules (robustness check)

DV: Transition peaceful	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Inherited succession rule	2.662** (0.848)		2.747** (0.988)	
Inherited VP rule		3.429*** (0.963)		3.018^ (1.554)
Inherited Other rule		0.657 (1.316)		2.183^ (1.275)
Constitution			-1.163 (1.663)	-1.343 (2.047)
Ruling party			-0.951 (0.822)	-0.843 (0.660)
Leader duration			0.151* (0.064)	0.144* (0.063)
GDP per capita			0.923 (0.695)	0.940 (0.699)
Oil production			-0.861 (0.770)	-0.871 (0.776)
Population			0.278 (0.364)	0.338 (0.362)
Ethnic frac			1.049 (2.082)	0.753 (2.259)
Cold War			-0.668 (1.445)	-0.712 (1.518)
British			0.282 (1.296)	0.119 (1.449)
French			-1.173 (1.047)	-0.972 (1.330)
Constant	-2.043*** (0.409)	-2.043*** (0.409)	-6.152 (4.901)	-6.307 (4.505)
Observations	81	81	79	79
Pseudo R2	0.234	0.299	0.523	0.525

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Logistic regression used in all models.

\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, ^p<0.10

To address concerns about endogenous institutional creation, I run a set of models using *inherited* constitutional rules. As discussed earlier, since institutions are not assigned at random, the reader may be concerned that the relationship between constitutional rules and peaceful succession is endogenous. To deal with this concern, I consider cases where the leader *inherited* (rather than created) formal rules about succession. I create new variable, ***Inherited succession rule***, which takes a value of 1 if the constitutional succession rule was already in place when the leader came into power. To maintain comparability, I drop founding presidents for this analysis because they do not have predecessors to inherit a constitution from.

Appendix Table 15: Heckman selection model (robustness check)

DV: Transition peaceful	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Succession rule	1.105** (0.399)		1.405^ (0.757)	
VP rule		1.475*** (0.415)		4.676* (1.971)
Other Rule		0.291 (0.546)		1.100 (1.223)
Leader duration			0.032 (0.029)	0.084 (0.050)
GDP per capita			2.914** (0.981)	3.691** (1.402)
Oil production			-2.277** (0.815)	-3.267* (1.344)
Population			0.570* (0.288)	1.298* (0.535)
Ethnic frac			1.635 (2.594)	-2.622 (2.590)
Cold War			2.092*** (0.615)	3.652* (1.718)
British			-1.881* (0.858)	-3.527** (1.306)
French			-1.567 (0.947)	-1.443 (1.203)
Constant	-0.431 (0.363)	-0.431 (2.268)	-9.644** (3.208)	-15.547** (5.681)
Observations	119	119	116	116

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Heckman selection model (Stata “*heckprob*”) used in all models.

\*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, ^p<0.10

In order to account for the sequencing of leadership transition events, I replicate my analysis using a Heckman selection model, rather than a logit model. This method is used for estimating regressions where the dependent variable is censored for a non-random portion of the data. In this case, we observe whether the incoming leader took power peacefully only if the incumbent left office peacefully. The Heckman model includes two equations: a selection equation focusing on selection into the sample of peaceful incumbent exit, and the main regression equation linking constitutional rules to the probability that the successor will come to power peacefully (i.e. that the leadership transition will be coded as peaceful). I do not report results from the selection equation, since my earlier analysis already focused on explaining peaceful incumbent exit.