

**Winning the Game of Thrones:
Leadership Succession in Modern Autocracies**

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
Abstract:

Under what conditions can dictatorships manage peaceful leadership transitions? This article argues that constitutional succession rules are critical for modern dictatorships, contrary to the predominant scholarly focus on hereditary succession or parties. An effective succession rule needs to solve dual problems of peaceful exit and peaceful entry. First, the rule must enable incumbents to exit power peacefully by reducing external coup threats. Second, the rule must empower the designated successor to ensure that they can enter power peacefully. Written constitutional rules help solve both problems, and are particularly effective when they appoint the vice president as the designated successor. The vice president's access to material resources deters other factions from challenging the succession procedure, whereas designating successors without a power base is ineffective. I show empirical evidence of my theory using original data on constitutional rules and the appointment of designated successors in 46 African countries from 1960-2010.

1. Introduction

Leadership succession is a fundamental and existential challenge facing all authoritarian regimes. Unlike democracies, one of the defining characteristics of dictatorships is the absence of free and fair elections as a mechanism for leader selection. The succession challenge in autocracies is often exacerbated when strongman dictators declare themselves “president for life” and evoke images of divine rule, suggesting that they are essentially irreplaceable. However, all leaders, even those who are president for life, die at some point. Regimes cannot survive unless they are able to pass power from one leader to another. As Figure 1 shows, the majority all modern autocracies are not able to live up to this task. From 1946 to 2014, only 44 percent of autocratic leadership transitions were peaceful and resulted in the continuation of the regime after the departure of the incumbent. For the remaining 56 percent of regimes, leadership succession was violent (including coups) – either because the incumbent was deposed or because the successor failed to take power. In such instances, the regime was unable to survive past the tenure of an individual dictator. Why are some autocratic regimes able to transfer power peacefully from one leader to another, while others cannot?

Despite the centrality of succession for long-run autocratic regime stability, there are surprisingly few studies dedicated to this topic. Most of the existing literature has focused almost exclusively the role of hereditary succession, especially in early European monarchies (Herb 1999; Kurrild-Klitgaard 2000; Kokkonen and Sundell 2014; Kokkonen and Sundell 2020; Tullock 1987). A small number of studies that mention non-hereditary solutions to succession argue that ruling parties play an important role in facilitating peaceful transitions (Geddes 1999; Magaloni 2008).



However, both of these proposed mechanisms fail to explain leadership succession in modern autocracies. First, hereditary succession is incredibly rare in post-World War II dictatorships. Out of all autocratic leadership transitions that occurred between 1946 to 2014, hereditary succession occurred less than *three* percent of the time (Archigos). Second, ruling parties are extremely common in dictatorships, yet many are very weak organizations. In fact, most ruling parties are unable to outlive the death or departure of the founding leader, therefore rendering the party unable to regulate the subsequent transfer of power (author).¹

This article argues that we cannot understand succession in modern autocracies without studying the content of constitutions. I claim that constitutional rules that designate a formal successor play a critical role in promoting peaceful leadership transitions in dictatorships. When succession rules do not exist, elites anticipate eventual conflict over the transition and are incentivized to preemptively grab power while the

¹ 84 percent of autocracies from 1946-2010 had a ruling party (Cheibub, Gandhi, Vreeland 2010), and 57 percent of these parties failed to outlive the founding leader (author).

incumbent is still in office. Succession rules reduce this coup threat by creating a focal point – the designated successor – for elites to coordinate around. Moreover, once named, the designated successor has a strong incentive to protect the existing regime, providing a “barrier effect” for the incumbent. Leaders avoid being overthrown by their own successors (also known as the crown prince problem) by *strategically* picking deputies who are strong enough to help protect them against external coup plots, but *not strong enough* to unilaterally overthrow them. Succession planning through the adoption of constitutional rules therefore enables incumbents to exit power peacefully.

However, the succession process does not end there. In order for a leadership transition to be peaceful, the outgoing leader must exit office peacefully, *and the incoming leader must successfully take power*. In many instances, the incumbent dies peacefully while in office, only to result in violent conflict over the future of the presidency. We cannot know the conditions that allow for peaceful leadership transitions without understanding how successors take power. For the regime to survive, the incoming leader must “win the game of thrones”.

Here, I argue that only *some types of succession rules* – specifically those that empower the incoming leader via access to real de facto power – *are effective* at ensuring that the designated successor will ascend to the presidency. Succession rules vary in their content: some constitutions appoint the vice president as the designated successor, while others may appoint the president of the legislature as the designated successor. Yet these seemingly small institutional differences lead to very different outcomes. The office of the vice president is a powerful position. It is a top cabinet post, second only to the president, and comes with a lucrative stream of patronage and access to key state

functions. Using these material advantages, the vice president can cultivate his own independent base of support while the incumbent is still in power, which raises the cost of rebelling against him during or after the transition.

By contrast, constitutional rules that designate a position *without significant material resources and power* as the successor are largely ineffective at bringing that person to power. The president of the legislature, a position that is not in the executive, lacks the material resources of a high-level cabinet seat and is far from the apex of power. As a result, it is much more difficult for successors in this position to consolidate enough power to ascend to the presidency following the departure of the incumbent. Altogether, my theory suggests that while a broad range of constitutional rules can help incumbents ward off coup threats, ensuring that the successor comes to power is a much taller order, and only *some* constitutional arrangements facilitate this outcome.

I show empirical evidence of these arguments using original data on constitutional succession rules and the appointment of successors in 46 African countries from 1960-2010. Sub-Saharan Africa is a rich context in which to examine this puzzle because it is a region that is often plagued by coups and violent leader deposals, yet many African leaders have also experienced peaceful transfers of power. Moreover, virtually every country in Africa was authoritarian for decades after independence, and there is much variation in the content of constitutions across countries and over time.

Consistent with my theory, I find that leaders with constitutional succession rules are significantly less likely to be deposed, and this is true regardless of the position of the designated successor. However, *only* regimes with constitutional rules naming the vice president (“VP rule”) as the designated successor are significantly more likely to undergo

peaceful transitions. Moreover, I show evidence that the mechanism through which this occurs is by empowering the designated successor – vice presidents are much more likely to ascend to the presidency following the departure of the incumbent compared with successors in other positions. The size of the effect is quite substantial: the inclusion of the VP rule increases the likelihood of a peaceful transition by 56 percent. While regimes without the VP rule have only a 11 percent chance of a peaceful transition, regimes with the VP rule have a 67 percent chance of a peaceful transition. By contrast, the presence of a constitutional succession rule designating a position *other* than the vice president does not appear to have a significant effect in promoting peaceful transitions.

This study makes a number of important contributions to theories of authoritarian survival, comparative constitutions, and African politics. This article is the first to explain how and when constitutional rules empower incoming leaders, allowing them to successfully take office – a crucial element for peaceful transitions. Virtually all existing research has focused only on explaining the peaceful *exit* of incumbents by showing that succession planning decreases the probability of elite coups (Frantz and Stein 2017; Kurrild-Klitgaard 2000; Kokkonen and Sundell 2014; Tullock 1987). Yet ensuring peaceful incumbent exit is only half of the (metaphorical) battle. In order for the regime to survive, the incoming leader must successfully and peacefully take power. This is not an easy task. In 22 percent of transitions in all autocracies from 1946-2014, peaceful incumbent exit was followed by a violent seizure of power. In contrast with existing scholarship, this article is the first to disaggregate the transition outcome and examine the conditions that allow successors to come to power.

Second, this article shows that constitutions *matter*, even in dictatorships. Scholars have only recently acknowledged that authoritarian constitutions are not merely window dressing. Constitutions can play a meaningful role in regime maintenance by creating observable signals that elites can coordinate around (Albertus and Menaldo 2012; Barros 2002; Ginsburg and Simpser 2014; Myerson 2008). However, empirical studies of authoritarian constitutions have rarely examined variation in the *content* of constitutional rules. This article demonstrates that the content of constitutional rules is critical in determining the outcome of leadership succession. It is often not enough to simply have *any kind* of succession plan; the regime must have the *right kind* of succession plan in order to bring the successor to power. Constitutions matter, not because they establish de jure rules, but when they affect de facto political power.

Third, this article has important implications for African politics. Existing scholarship on leadership succession in Sub-Saharan Africa has generally held a pessimistic view about the prospect of peaceful and constitutional transitions, especially in the decades prior to democratization in the early 1990s (Posner and Young 2007). Coups were long considered the modal type of leadership change in Africa, and this was particularly true during the Cold War era (Decalo 1976). In fact, an early study even referred to the challenge of succession as the “Gordian Knot of African Politics” (Sylla and Goldhammer 1982). In their influential volume on African regimes, Jackson and Rosberg (1982) predicted that leadership succession will continue to be resolved by informal (and often violent) power politics, rather than institutionalized rules. By contrast, this article demonstrates that not all leadership transitions that take place within autocracies in Sub-Saharan Africa are unregulated or driven solely by violence. Rather

than serving as empty parchment institutions, constitutional rules can play an important role in regulating the transmission of executive authority, even during the most authoritarian decades of rule.

2. Succession Planning in Modern Dictatorships

There have been surprisingly few studies documenting how modern autocracies² govern leadership transitions. Despite scholarly focus on monarchies and hereditary succession, familial transfers of power are incredibly rare in post-World War II dictatorships. Only six percent of all autocratic regimes from 1946-2010 are coded as monarchies, and out of those monarchies, only seven³ remain in power today (Geddes, Wright, Frantz 2014). In non-monarchical regimes, less than *three* percent of direct power transfers occur between family members. Even political dynasties are surprisingly rare. Only five percent of all autocratic leaders worldwide have any family ties with earlier incumbents (author's calculations based on data from Archigos).

Instead of hereditary succession, modern autocracies often use constitutional rules to regulate leadership transitions. Before discussing how succession rules promote peaceful transitions, I first describe what these rules typically look like and highlight some important differences across constitutions.

A typical constitutional succession rule outlines formal procedures to replace the leader in the case of the incumbent's death, resignation, or permanent incapacity.

² I use the terms "authoritarian regime" and "dictatorship" synonymously. I also use the terms "dictator", "authoritarian leader", and "president" interchangeably.

³ Monarchies still in power include Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Swaziland, and the UAE.

Importantly, the rule will often designate an interim leader, which is understood to be the designated successor. For instance, the 1963 Kenyan constitution (Chapter II, Part I,

Section 6) included a clause that states:

- (1) If the office of President becomes vacant by reason of the death or resignation of the President...an election of a President shall be held within the period of ninety days immediately following the occurrence of the vacancy.
- (2) While the office of the President is vacant, the functions of that office shall be exercised –
 - a. By the Vice President

A number of recent studies have highlighted the role of constitutions in supporting autocratic rule, departing from earlier scholarship that disregarded autocratic constitutions as merely “window dressing.” Constitutional rules play a powerful role in regulating autocratic leadership transitions by serving as an “operating manual” (Przeworski 2014). Unlike democracies, dictatorships do not have a ready-made system of replacing leaders and in the absence of formal succession plans, elites may be tempted to seize power through force. Indeed, coups are the most common way in which autocratic leaders lose power (Svolik 2012). Autocratic constitutions help solve this dilemma by describing *how* the government should function in the case of the president’s absence or departure, providing a “blueprint” for elites and other key regime forces, such as the military, to follow (Barros 2002, Ginsburg and Simpser 2014).

Autocratic constitutions promote authoritarian stability through two key mechanisms: information and coordination. Dictatorships are often characterized by secrecy and a lack of transparency. When rules are not written down, it is unclear whether the dictator has engaged in wrongdoing, making it difficult for elites to coordinate a response. Constitutions solve this coordination problem by creating a

publicly observable set of rules (Albertus and Menaldo 2012). Rulers can use constitutions to make promises to share spoils and power with elites (often by limiting their own executive power), and the establishment of clear mutual expectations allow elites to credibly threaten to sanction the leader if he violates these rules (Myerson 2008; Weingast 1997). Through these two mechanisms, constitutions can stabilize power sharing agreements between leaders and elites (Albertus and Menaldo 2014; Gandhi 2008). Elite cohesion, in turn, deters popular uprisings and protects the regime against unrest from the masses (Levitsky and Way 2002; Slater 2010).

These mechanisms also help facilitate leadership transitions by identifying and legitimizing the designated successor. Transitions are periods with high levels of uncertainty. When a leader dies or steps down from office, key regime actors such as the cabinet, military, and courts, look for clear signals to determine their response. Constitutions, which are publicly observable, serve as a useful coordination tool and also impart a sense of *de jure* legitimacy to the designated successor (Ginsberg and Simpser 2014). In fact, when the 2012 presidential transition in Malawi was challenged by a rival faction, the military and courts quickly backed the constitutional successor, Joyce Banda, citing the constitution as the key reason for their decision (Dionne and Dulani 2012). Without the support of these key actors, attempts to sidestep the planned succession failed.

However, constitutional succession rules vary in their content, and these institutional differences lead to very different transition outcomes. First, some succession rules are vague and do not identify a specific successor. For instance, from 1960 to 1975, the constitution of Chad included a rule stating: “In case of death or permanent incapacity

of the Head of State, determined by the Supreme Court, pending the appointment of his successor, the ministers undertake the current affairs of the office under the supervision of one of the ministers as designated for this purpose by the Council of Ministers.”

Despite having some language about a succession procedure, this rule does not identify who the designated successor will be, which does not solve the coordination problem of identifying a new leader to rally around.

In fact, I argue that constitutional succession rules are self-enforcing *only when* they identify a designated successor. The creation of a formal succession hierarchy consolidates a new distribution of power – the designated successor becomes a focal point for elites to coordinate around. Moreover, as I will discuss in the next section, successors gain significant de facto power through their access to state resources. This combination of de jure legitimacy with de facto power allows constitutional successors to build their own base of support in preparation for the transition. As Albertus and Menaldo (2012) argue, “a constitution can enable the rise of a *new autocratic coalition*” (283, emphasis added).

A second important way in which constitutional rules differ is the *position* that is identified as the designated successor. Vice presidents are most commonly identified as the constitutional successor, reflected in the Kenya example provided above. Similarly, prime ministers are also often identified as the formal successor. The 1977 constitution of Burkina Faso, for instance, included the following rule: “In the case of temporary incapacity or impeachment, the duties of the President are taken over by the Prime Minister.” It is important note that within my sample of African countries, regimes *either* have a vice president *or* a prime minister, but not both. These two offices are functionally

equivalent, and they are the second highest position in the government, subordinate only to the president. I will refer to this number-two position in the regime as the “vice president” position for the remainder of the article, but readers should know that this shorthand also includes prime ministers.⁴

Constitutional rules also frequently name the president of the legislature as the designated successor. For example, the constitution of Senegal from 1960 to 1975 included a rule stating: “The President of the Republic shall be replaced by the President of the National Assembly in the event of resignation, incapacity, or death.” Similarly, 2003 constitution of the Democratic Republic of Congo stated: “In the case of vacancy as a result of death, of resignation or for any other cause of definitive incapacity, the functions of the President of the Republic... are provisionally exercised by the President of the Senate.”

In my sample of African regimes, these are two general types of constitutional successors: the vice president and the president of the legislature. In 61 percent of country-year observations in which a succession rule existed, the vice president was designated as the official successor. In 34 percent of country-year observations, the president of the National Assembly or the president of the Senate was designated as the constitutional successor. A very small number of cases designate some other position, such as the general secretary of the ruling party or the president of the supreme court, as

⁴ There are a small number of African regimes that have both positions for a short period of time. For these cases, I focus on the position that the constitution identifies as the designated successor.

the successor.⁵ As I will argue in the next section, different offices come with varying access to state resources, which in turn, affects the successor's ability to come to power after the incumbent departs. To sum, constitutional rules vary in their content, and these institutional differences lead to divergent outcomes.

It is helpful to address concerns about endogeneity. Identifying the effect of institutions that are not randomly assigned is a difficult and endemic problem in the study of authoritarian politics (Pepinsky 2014). Readers may wonder whether the underlying dynamics motivating elites to create succession policies in the first place is driving transition outcomes, rather than the institutions themselves. On one hand, it is possible that leaders who are extremely stable in their rule and anticipate having a peaceful transition are the only actors who feel secure enough to create explicit succession policies. If this is the case, then the relationship between succession policies and peaceful transitions is simply a reflection of the regime's stability and not the independent effect of institutions on leadership transitions.

However, a leader who is *already* secure and anticipates a smooth succession has no reason to create succession policies since a peaceful transition is possible *without* institutions. In fact, studies of endogenous institutional creation argue that leaders create power sharing institutions *only when* faced with a credible threat of rebellion from elites (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix and Svolik 2013; Gandhi 2008; Paine forthcoming). Leaders who do *not* face a credible threat of removal can remain in power whether they create institutions or not.

⁵ Appendix Table 1 includes a full list of all constitutional succession rules for the transitions in my sample, and Appendix Table 2 lists the distribution of designated successors.

We should therefore expect incumbents who are *most likely* to experience *violent* transitions to create succession policies. In fact, this logic also answers the question: if planning for succession promotes regime durability, then why don't all dictators plan for succession? Leaders who feel quite secure in their positions are less likely to formalize succession procedures because such incumbents are not at risk of being deposed, even if they do not designate a line of succession. Existing research shows this empirical pattern in Africa: founding leaders who come to power with exceptionally high levels of popularity and legitimacy are significantly less likely to create constitutional succession rules (author). The strategic logic of institutional creation thus alleviates concerns that the observed effects of institutions are merely reflections of underlying power dynamics, rather than the effect of succession planning.

3. How Succession Planning Promotes Peaceful Transitions

Autocratic leaders face a general dilemma when deciding whether to plan for succession. On one hand, not having succession rules can pose a grave threat to leaders. When there is no clear plan governing the future transition, elites anticipate eventual conflict over succession. They may be tempted to seize power while the incumbent is still in office to preempt the eventual power vacuum (Frantz and Stein 2017; Kokkonen and Sundell 2014). The creation of a clear line of succession therefore deters elites looking to capitalize on future uncertainty from staging coups during the autocrat's reign.

However, planning for succession can *also* create a serious threat for the incumbent: the crown prince problem. Herz (1957) famously argued that by grooming a successor, incumbents create their own worst enemy. The mere designation of an

alternative center of power makes leaders vulnerable to being deposed prematurely by their own chosen successor. By naming a successor, the ruler voluntarily shifts the center of power away from himself, putting himself at risk of being overthrown by his own appointee.

To counter these dual threats, I argue that leaders strategically appoint successors who are *strong enough to help shield them against external coup plots, but not strong enough to unilaterally overthrow them*. As I will discuss further in the next section, incumbents often set up succession plans to benefits *themselves*, but not necessarily their successors. The crown prince problem looms large in the dictator's mind, and this persistent threat affects the institutional design of succession planning.

Authoritarian Stability: The benefits of succession planning

Succession planning through the creation of a constitutional rules decreases the likelihood that the incumbent will be overthrown through several channels. First, succession rules deter coups by reducing elites' incentive to preemptively grab power while the leader is still in office. Constitutional rules that identify a successor create a focal point by identifying the next leader, which solves the elite coordination problem surrounding the transition (Frantz and Stein 2017; Kokkonen and Sundell 2014).

Second, succession rules also promote autocratic stability through the "barrier effect." Once named, designated successors have a strong incentive to protect the existing regime against external threats, providing a "barrier" for the incumbent. When leaders designate a successor, this deputy is incentivized to protect the existing regime, since preserving the status quo is the best guarantee that they will become the next leader. The

designated successor therefore “constitutes an additional hurdle for contenders who aim at taking over the power from the incumbent” (Konrad and Mui 2017, 2159).

Moreover, access to material resources through cabinet appointments allow successors to begin consolidating their authority while the incumbent is still in office. Designated successors are often high-level cabinet ministers, and these cabinet appointments provide elites with de facto power. Cabinet ministers have access to material resources (including lucrative government contracts) and the ability to shape policy, allowing them to target patronage directly to their supporters. This access to de facto power and resources allows the successor to cultivate their alliances and consolidate their own base of support.

When the successor is empowered, they become an even more valuable ally for the incumbent in deterring coup threats. When successors are able to cultivate their own base of support, this raises the coordination cost of launching an outside rebellion. Not only would an elite challenger have to successfully overcome the incumbent and his supporters, would-be coup plotters also must contend with the successor and his supporters. Altogether, this decreases the probability that a coup would succeed.

When there is doubt that a coup attempt will succeed, this doubt becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. The outcome of coup attempts often rests critically on the military’s perception of its success (Singh 2014). In determining who to side with in during a coup attempt, soldiers are primarily concerned with avoiding unnecessary bloodshed. Military actors therefore cast their support for the side they believe will win. Empowering a loyal successor is therefore a crucial coup-proofing mechanism.

Maintaining elite cohesion also deters popular uprisings and protects the regime against societal unrest. Although successful revolutions are much rarer than coups, discontent that starts at the top can trickle down with dangerous consequences. Elite defections are known to be one of the primary drivers of regime breakdown (Haggard and Kaufman 1997; Reuter and Gandhi 2011). Furthermore, regimes are more capable of suppressing popular discontent when elites are unified (Slater 2010). Altogether, these arguments yield the first testable hypothesis.

H1: Incumbents with constitutional succession rules should be less likely to be deposed.

The reader may wonder if an additional coup threat may emerge if elites who were *not* chosen to be the successor feel slighted. Such threats are offset by two factors. First, elites who wish to rebel against the leader and his successor still face an unresolved coordination problem: who among them will replace the incumbent? Second, once a successor is named, the probability that any other elite can successfully carry out a coup drops significantly. Not only will the successor side with the incumbent in the event of a challenge, the successor gains influence and resources through the cabinet position they now control. To sum, although the designation of a successor eliminates the possibility for other elites to assume the presidency, “the victims of this arrangement are relatively few compared with the number of beneficiaries of an orderly succession” (Zeng 2019, 6).

The Crown Prince Problem: How incumbents strategically plan for succession

As discussed above, constitutional rules that identify a successor protect the incumbent against *external* threats, primarily coups that result from anticipated

succession conflict. However, by appointing a formal successor, the incumbent now faces a possible *internal* threat from his own deputy. Why wouldn't the successor, once named, take advantage of his new stature and overthrow the incumbent? In fact, the very mechanisms that make the successor a strong ally against outsider rebellions, also make the successor the most dangerous usurper.

There are two primary strategies rulers use to avoid the crown prince problem. The first strategy is to strategically appoint successors who are not strong enough to unilaterally overthrow them.⁶ Appointees who are not strong enough to depose the leader are incentivized to wait patiently for the incumbent to die or retire, rather than try to capture power preemptively through a coup. By picking a somewhat weak challenger as the designated successor, the incumbent gets the added protection of having a "barrier" against external coup plots without putting himself at risk for being overthrown by his deputy. Jomo Kenyatta, the first president of Kenya, followed such a strategy. Kenyatta's vice president and constitutional successor, Daniel arap Moi, was not a member of the dominant ethnic group in the country. Furthermore, Moi was not perceived to be a particularly shrewd politician, and elites would often make "Moi jokes" behind his back (Bienen and van de Walle 1991, 6). Although appointing a somewhat weak successor does limit the successor's ability to defend the leader against external threats, this is a tradeoff that incumbents are willing to make since the strategy sidesteps the crown prince problem.

⁶ The reader may wonder whether leaders can also avoid the crown prince problem by appointing a "loyal ally" such as a family member or co-ethnic. However, existing research shows, in short, that dictators have no loyal allies. Family members overthrow incumbents all the time (author, Sundell and Kokkonen 2014), and African leaders are frequently deposed in coups by their co-ethnics (Roessler 2011).

A second strategy is to design the constitutional rule so that designated successor is a position with weaker authority. Recall that in Sub-Saharan Africa, the two most common constitutional successor appointees are the vice president or president of the legislature. However, these two offices are quite different in the amount of resources that they control. While the vice president is a powerful position with access to material resources, the president of the legislature is a much weaker position in comparison.

The office of the vice president is the top cabinet position, second only to the president. As discussed before, high-level cabinet appointments provide elites with access to state resources, which they can use to “reward allies and eliminate rivals” (Hughes and May 1988, 14). This is especially true when the vice president is allowed to perform functions associated with the office of the president, such as leading cabinet meetings or conducting official state visits to other countries. Vice presidents also benefit, by extension, from the popularity or legitimacy of the president (Zeng 2019).

By contrast, the president of the legislature comes with significantly less resources and influence.⁷ The position is not in the executive branch of the regime, and since it is not a cabinet office, lacks access to state resources. This position is further weakened by the fact that many authoritarian legislatures are considered rubber-stamp institutions. Since material resources constitute a key way in which successors can expand their support base, the president of the legislature is much more limited in his

⁷ I do not claim that this position has no resources or influence at all, simply that it is weaker position compared to the office of the vice president.

ability to consolidate power. In order to avoid the crown prince problem, rulers would sometimes appoint the president of the legislature as the designated successor.⁸

To sum, rulers have two options to ensure that their designated successor is not strong enough to single handedly overthrow them. First, they can designate a strong office (such as the vice president) as the constitutional successor but appoint a somewhat weak elite to that position. Second, they can designate a weaker office (such as the president of the legislature) as the constitutional successor. Both of these strategies constitute the incumbent's optimal solution when facing dual threats of outsider rebellions and the crown prince problem. However, these differences in institutional design affect the successor's ability to come to power.

Taking the throne: Empowering successors

While incumbents prefer to keep their successors somewhat weak, this strategy creates a challenge for the transition: successors that are *too* weak do not succeed in coming to power. Taking the throne is not easy. In my sample, 37 percent of peaceful incumbent exits result in the breakdown of the regime over succession conflict. The most straightforward way in which a peaceful transition can occur is for the designated successor to become the next leader. When there is disagreement over the succession hierarchy, the regime faces the possibility of coup attempts (Frantz and Stein 2017) or worse, the outbreak of civil wars (Kokkonen and Sundell 2020).

⁸ This particular strategy became more common after the 1990s, likely because the position was *too* weak (or sometimes non-existent) during the Cold War.

I argue that constitutional rules that empower the successor by providing them with access to material resources are more effective in bringing that deputy to power. In particular, vice presidents are more likely to ascend to the presidency, compared with successors in positions with a weaker power base, such as the president of the legislature. Since the office of the vice president is the highest cabinet position, successors in this position can utilize material resources to consolidate support, even if they were not inherently a particularly strong elite.

This mechanism is illustrated by the first transition of power in Kenya. Kenyatta, the founding president of Kenya, appointed Moi as his vice president and constitutionally designated successor in 1967. Moi did not begin his tenure as vice president in a position of strength – he was not a member of the dominant ethnic group that controlled the government. In 1976, a faction that opposed Moi proposed that the constitutional succession rule be changed so that the vice president would not serve as the interim president. Moi responded by obtaining statements of support from 88 MPs, 10 cabinet ministers, and the Attorney General (Karimi and Ochieng 1980; Widner 1992). The proposal to change the constitutional rule quickly failed, and Moi took office in 1978, following the death of Kenyatta. While the constitutional succession rule provided Moi with *de jure* legitimacy, the office of the vice president armed him with *de facto* power. As Tamarkin (1979) summarizes: “The anti-Moi group suffered a severe setback in its attempt to assert itself. If they thought of pursuing their struggle they would have to do it against the backdrop of a *grim political reality* and with a *debilitating constitutional constraint*” (24 emphasis added).

By contrast, constitutional rules that designate a successor without significant material resources (such as the president of the legislature) are largely ineffective at bringing that person to power. While this strategy may protect incumbents from being unseated by their own successor, it ultimately dooms the regime by failing to empower the incoming leader. In fact, interestingly, constitutional rules that do not empower the designated successor can actually *invite* conflict if another elite with sufficient de facto power (such as the vice president) can mount a credible challenge for the throne.

This tension between de facto power and de jure rules is illustrated in the first presidential transition in Cote d'Ivoire. The founding president, Felix Houphouët-Boigny, famously wary of the crown prince problem, waited until a few years before his death to create a constitutional succession rule. The rule appointed the president of the national assembly, Henri Bédié, as the lawful successor (but Houphouët did not publicly endorse him). In 1991, a power struggle over the impending succession emerged between Bédié and Houphouët's prime minister, Alassane Ouattara. Two factions, one supporting Bédié and the other supporting Ouattara emerged during this period (McGovern 2011). Houphouët died in 1993 and Bédié assumed the presidency. However, six years later, Bédié was ousted in a coup that was staged by members of the military who were linked to Ouattara (Rabinowitz 2018).

It is useful to note the death of the incumbent is not always how leadership transitions occur. Leaders sometimes voluntarily choose to retire, often due to health reasons. This occurs 31 percent of the time in my sample. However, regardless of the incumbent's method of exit, successors cannot simply rely on their predecessor's support to bring them to power. Incumbents design succession plans to ensure the stability of

their *own* reign, and such plans often center around putting successor in a somewhat weak position. Whether the designated successor is able to ascend to the presidency depends on their ability to amass their own support base.

To sum, constitutional rules vary in the extent to which they are effective at bringing the successor to power. Since peaceful transitions require incumbent exit *and* successor entry to be peaceful, empowering the designated successor is key. I therefore expect constitutional rules naming the vice president as the designated successor (“VP rule”) to be more effective at promoting peaceful transitions. These theoretical arguments produce two additional hypotheses.

H2: Regimes with the VP rule should be more likely to undergo peaceful transitions.

H3: Designated successors under the VP rule should be more likely to come to power.

4. Data and Descriptive Statistics

I now provide empirical evidence of my theory using original data on succession planning and leadership transitions in all authoritarian regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1960 to 2010.⁹ The data is cross sectional, and the unit of analysis is the transition. A transition is observed if the outgoing leader departed office between 1960 and 2010.¹⁰

⁹ Because my theory focuses on authoritarian leadership transitions, I drop country-years that are coded as democracy for at least a ten-year period by Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010). Most African states have been and continue to be authoritarian, and only 11 countries exit the sample after 1991.

¹⁰ Following existing conventions, I require that the outgoing leader be in office for at least 3 years to be included in the dataset (Geddes 1999).

If a leader was still in power as of 2010 but has exited office since, I include the transition observation in my dataset. If a leader was still in power as of 2010, and still remains in power today, I do not include the leader in the dataset because the transition is unobserved. If a country becomes coded as a democracy following the departure of a leader, then that transition is not included in the study because the mechanisms of leadership selection are different under democracy. The full list of leaders included in this study is reported in Appendix Table 3.

Dependent Variables

There are three main dependent variables in this study. The first dependent variable, *Incumbent deposed*, is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the incumbent's method of exit is coded as "Irregular" by Archigos.¹¹

The second dependent variable, *Transition peaceful*, is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the leadership transition is peaceful. I use the following rules to identify peaceful leadership transitions. (1) The outgoing leader has an immediate successor following their departure from office. (2) *Incumbent deposed* is coded as 0. (3) The method of entry for the successor is coded as "regular" by Archigos and the incoming leader remains in office for at least a year.¹²

Non-peaceful transitions occur *either* if the outgoing leader was deposed, or if the incoming leader takes power through coercion or extra-constitutional means. For

¹¹ "Irregular" exits include: popular protest, removed by military, removed by other government actors, removed by rebels, and removed through threat of foreign force.

¹² There are a small number of cases where, following the death of a leader, the successor is overthrown after a few days or weeks in office. I do not consider this a peaceful transition.

instance, Kwame Nkrumah, the first president of Ghana, was deposed in a coup six years after taking office – a clear case of a non-peaceful transition. Transitions can also be non-peaceful if the outgoing leader exits office peacefully, but conflict over succession emerges and the incoming leader does not take power peacefully. The first president of Guinea, Sekou Toure, died of a heart attack on March 26, 1984. Although the Prime Minister, Louis Lansana Beavogui, became the acting president following Sekou Toure’s death, the military seized power in a coup eight days later.

The third dependent variable, *Designated successor take power*, is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the incoming leader was the constitutionally designated successor leading up to the transition. This variable is coded only for regimes that experience a peaceful transition.¹³ The structure of the data and dependent variables are illustrated graphically in Figure 2.


Independent Variables

For my independent variables, I collected original data on constitutional succession rules and designated successors in 46 African countries between 1960-2010. For each country in my dataset, I recorded whether the constitution had a succession rule and if so, who the designated successor was.¹⁴

¹³ If the incumbent was overthrown, we do not observe whether the designated successor would have taken power. There are a small number of regimes that experienced a peaceful transition but did not have a clear succession rule. I code those cases as 0 for this variable, although excluding these cases does not alter the substantive findings.

¹⁴ Data on constitutional succession rules was coded using constitutions in the Comparative Constitutions Project repository. Data on the designated successors was coded using the Europa World Year Book.

Figure 2: Data Structure



Using this constitutional data, I create a number of independent variables.

Succession Rule, is a dummy variable¹⁵ that takes a value of 1 if the regime had a constitutional rule that clearly identifies the designated successor.¹⁶ I only consider succession rules that were in place in the years leading up to the leadership transition. If, for example, a leader had succession rules at the start of his tenure, but then eliminated them before exiting office, then these rules would not have been in place to facilitate the transition.

¹⁵ I also create a count version of this variable, which records the number of years the rule was in place leading up to the transition, for a robustness check.

¹⁶ I also create a variable, *Vague succession rule*, that takes a value of 1 for rules that do not clearly identify a successor for a robustness check.

I also disaggregate the *Succession Rule* variable by creating two additional variables that record *who* the designated successor was. *VP rule* is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the regime had a constitutional rule stating that the vice president (or prime minister) is the designated successor. *Other rule*, is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the regime had a constitutional rule stating that someone *other than* the vice president is the designated successor. For both of these variables, I only consider succession rules that were in place in the years leading up to the transition.

In addition to my main independent variables, I also include a number of controls that reflect leader, regime, and country-level characteristics. Table 1 includes a list of all the variables used in the empirical analysis, variable descriptions, and summary statistics.

Descriptive Statistics

The resulting data includes 119 leadership transitions that occurred between 1960 and 2010 in Sub-Saharan Africa. Smooth transitions do not occur easily: only 28 percent of transitions in my sample were peaceful. The data emphasizes the importance of understanding how successors take power peacefully: in 37 percent of cases, peaceful incumbent exit was followed by a violent seizure of power. 45 percent of cases in my sample had a succession rule; 68 percent of these rules named the VP as the designated successor (VP rule) and 32 percent of these rules named someone other than the VP as the designated successor (Other rule).

Descriptive statistics quickly reveal that regimes with constitutional succession rules are associated with peaceful transitions. 51 percent of cases with constitutional succession rules undergo peaceful transitions, while only 10 percent of transitions

Table 1: Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics

	Variable description and notes	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
<i>Dependent Variables</i>						
Incumbent deposed	Takes a value of 1 if outgoing leader was deposed	119	.563	.498	0	1
Transition peaceful	Takes a value of 1 if outgoing leader exit is peaceful and incoming leader ascension is peaceful	119	.277	.449	0	1
Designated successor take power	Takes a value of 1 if incoming leader was the designated successor, conditional on peaceful transition	32	.531	.507	0	1
<i>Independent Variables</i>						
Succession rule	Takes a value of 1 if regime had a constitutional rule designating a specific order of succession at the time of the transition	119	.445	.499	0	1
VP rule	Takes a value of 1 if regime had a constitutional rule stating that the VP is the designated successor at the time of the transition	119	.302	.461	0	1
Other rule	Takes a value of 1 if regime had a constitutional rule stating that someone other than the VP is the designated successor at the time of the transition	119	.142	.351	0	1
<i>Control Variables</i>						
Constitution	Takes a value of 1 if regime had a constitution at the time of the transition. Source: Comparative Constitutions Project (2017)	119	.932	.251	0	1
Ruling party	Takes a value of 1 if regime had a ruling party at the time of the transition. Source: Cheibub, Gandhi, Vreeland (2010) and African Elections Database	119	.890	.313	0	1
Leader duration	Number of years the outgoing leader was in power at the time of the transition	119	11.873	8.842	3	42
GDP per capita	Value recorded for the year of the transition. Source: Vogt, et al. (2015)	114	1.548	2.003	.179	10.49
Oil production per capita	Value recorded for the year of the transition. Source: Vogt, et al. (2015)	114	.343	1.226	0	7.654
Population (logged)	Value recorded for the year of the transition. Source: Vogt, et al. (2015)	114	8.835	1.245	6.196	11.636
Ethnic fractionalization	Value recorded for the year of the transition. Source: Vogt, et al. (2015)	114	.683	.231	.035	.925
Cold War	Takes a value of 1 if transition fell on or prior to 1991	119	.504	.502	0	1
British	Takes a value of 1 if country was a former British colony	119	.352	.479	0	1
French	Takes a value of 1 if country was a former French colony	119	.436	.498	0	1

without succession rules are peaceful. The VP rule is especially effective: 64 percent of regimes with a VP rule undergo peaceful transitions. Appendix Table 4 provides cross tabs of transition outcomes and succession rules.

A number of interesting descriptive findings emerge from the data. The first important observation is that hereditary succession in Sub-Saharan Africa is quite rare, and this runs contrary to perceptions of the region as largely governed by nepotism and patrimonial rule.¹⁷ Only seven percent of power transfers (whether peaceful or not) occur between family members. Perhaps surprisingly, the majority of these cases were violent transfers of power: instances where leaders were deposed by their own relatives.¹⁸ Out of 8 observations of familial transfers of power, only 3 were peaceful. Even family dynasties occur very infrequently – only eight percent of leaders have any family ties with earlier incumbents. Hereditary succession is not a common mechanism that is used to regulate leadership transitions in Africa.

A second important descriptive finding is that the crown prince problem does not occur: incumbents are *not* overthrown by their designated successors. To determine this, I focus on the subsample of the data where the incumbent was deposed *and* had a designated successor, of which there are 17 cases. For these cases, I identified the designated successor at the time of overthrow as well as the identity of the individual(s) who overthrew the incumbent. In all of the cases, the person who staged the coup was not

¹⁷ I use the “family ties” variable from Archigos, which takes a value of 1 for leaders who are related through blood ties or marriage.

¹⁸ For example, in 1966, Jean-Bedel Bokassa seized power from David Dacko, his uncle, in the Central African Republic in a military coup.

the designated successor.¹⁹ This finding provides empirical support for my argument that incumbents strategically weaken their successors to counter the crown prince threat.

A third important observation is that nominally democratic institutions – namely constitutions and ruling parties – are incredibly common in dictatorships, and these institutions alone do not explain variation in regime durability. 93 percent of cases in my sample had a constitution at the time of the transition, and 89 percent of cases had a ruling party at the time of the transition. These patterns extend beyond Africa; from 1946 to 2008, 87 percent of all authoritarian regimes maintained a ruling party, and 93 percent had a constitution. Moreover, these trends are not simply a post-Cold War phenomenon. From 1946 to 1990, 84 percent of all authoritarian regimes had ruling parties, and 92 percent had constitutions. Yet the modal post-World War II leadership transition was violent. Simply having a constitution or ruling party is not sufficient in regulating peaceful transfers of power.

5. Empirical Analysis

The empirical analysis is broken down into three main parts. First, I show that succession planning decreases the likelihood that the incumbent will be deposed. Second, I provide evidence of my main argument: *that succession planning, specifically the VP rule, promotes peaceful leadership transitions*. Third, I show evidence of the mechanism: the VP rule increases the likelihood that the designated successor will come to power,

¹⁹ In fact, consistent with my theory, the designated successor is generally deposed with the incumbent (which is why successors are incentivized to protect the existing regime).

which ensures a peaceful transition. All the baseline regressions are estimated using logistic regression models with robust standard errors clustered by country.

Incumbent Exit

I first show that leaders who plan for succession are significantly less likely to be deposed (results reported in Table 2). The disaggregated version of the succession rules show that both VP rules and Other rules have a significant effect in decreasing the likelihood of overthrow, although Other rule is not robust to the inclusion of the full set of controls. The presence of a constitution or ruling party does not appear to have a significant effect in preventing the incumbent from being deposed, even in models that include a limited set of controls. The magnitude of the effects is not trivial; succession rules decrease the probability that the incumbent will be overthrown by 44 percent.²⁰ Figure 3 plots the predicted probabilities (and 95 percent confidence intervals) of peaceful incumbent exit conditional on having or not having succession rules.

Furthermore, I find that succession rules are effective in protecting the incumbent against challenges from above and below. In Appendix Table 5, I disaggregate the ways in which incumbents are overthrown into Coups versus External Challenges (which consist of popular uprisings and removal by rebel groups). Incumbents who have succession rules are significantly less likely to be deposed, regardless of whether the challenge emerges from within the regime or from external societal forces.


²⁰ Marginal effect calculated using Model (1) in Table 2.

Table 2: Was the incumbent deposed?

DV: Incumbent deposed	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Succession rule	-1.890*** (0.461)		-1.736*** (0.500)		-1.052^ (0.579)	
VP rule		-2.238*** (0.525)		-2.126*** (0.606)		-1.432* (0.664)
Other rule		-1.257* (0.597)		-0.949^ (0.565)		-0.497 (0.824)
Constitution			0.713 (1.164)	0.714 (1.185)	0.654 (1.136)	0.852 (1.185)
Ruling party			-2.033 (1.145)	-1.989 (1.155)	-1.618 (1.182)	-1.632 (1.159)
Leader duration			-0.045 (0.024)	-0.051* (0.025)	-0.040 (0.031)	-0.042 (0.031)
GDP per capita					-0.600* (0.282)	-0.570 (0.292)
Oil production					-0.141 (0.205)	-0.110 (0.217)
Population					-0.249 (0.190)	-0.319 (0.224)
Ethnic frac					-0.050 (1.574)	-0.056 (1.595)
Cold War					0.789 (0.545)	0.951 (0.590)
British					0.067 (0.732)	0.212 (0.764)
French					0.454 (0.713)	0.222 (0.772)
Constant	1.139*** (0.287)	1.139*** (0.287)	2.831 (1.548)	2.862 (1.551)	4.601 (2.738)	5.009 (2.840)
Observations	119	119	119	119	114	114
Pseudo R2	0.144	0.159	0.200	0.220	0.299	0.306

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Logistic regression used in all models.

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05



Leadership Transitions

I now provide evidence for my main argument: the VP rule promotes peaceful leadership transitions. Table 3 reports results of the logit analysis.²¹ The VP rule significantly increase the probability that the leadership transition will be peaceful, and this effect remains robust to the inclusion of the full set of controls. However, unlike the previous findings, Other rule is never significant – even in the model without any controls at all. While the Other rule may help incumbents ward off coups, it does not significantly improve the regime’s prospects for a peaceful transition. I also find that having a *vague* succession rule does not have a significant effect on the probability of a peaceful transition and these results are reported in Appendix Table 7.²²

The magnitude of the VP rule is large: it increases the probability of a peaceful transition by 56 percent. While regimes without the VP rule have only a 11 percent

²¹ The results remain consistent when using a linear probability model, rather than a logistic regression model. Appendix Table 6 reports regression results using OLS.

²² Recall that I define a vague succession rule as one that does not identify *who* the successor would be. 18 percent of cases have a vague succession rule.


Table 3: Was the leadership transition peaceful?

DV: Transition peaceful	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Succession rule	2.340*** (0.545)		2.258*** (0.531)		1.866** (0.625)	
VP rule		2.873*** (0.571)		2.957*** (0.711)		2.619** (0.978)
Other rule		1.124 (0.776)		0.669 (0.728)		0.826 (0.945)
Constitution			-0.811 (1.146)	-0.840 (1.199)	-0.957 (1.265)	-1.730 (1.476)
Ruling party			0.934 (1.181)	0.778 (1.357)	0.071 (0.802)	0.320 (0.717)
Leader duration			0.056 (0.030)	0.080* (0.034)	0.074 (0.044)	0.083 (0.051)
GDP per capita					1.873* (0.746)	1.990* (0.921)
Oil production					-1.035 (0.551)	-1.205 (0.727)
Population					0.356 (0.354)	0.540 (0.380)
Ethnic frac					3.334 (2.502)	3.298 (2.541)
Cold War					0.518 (0.629)	0.240 (0.640)
British					-1.597 (1.154)	-2.175 (1.241)
French					-1.803 (0.977)	-1.354 (1.227)
Constant	-2.303*** (0.447)	-2.303*** (0.447)	-3.101 (1.771)	-3.284 (1.856)	-9.130* (4.045)	-10.356* (4.460)
Observations	119	119	119	119	114	114
Pseudo R2	0.191	0.247	0.234	0.312	0.487	0.511

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Logistic regression used in all models.
 *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

chance of a peaceful transition, regimes with the VP rule have a 67 percent change of a peaceful transition (Figure 4).²³

²³ Marginal effects calculated using Model (2) of Table 3.



Having a constitution or a ruling party also does not appear to have a significant effect on transitions.²⁴ In fact, these two variables are never significant in any subsequent robustness checks. One potential concern is that parties may be especially weak in Sub-Saharan Africa – particularly during the early decades immediately following independence. To show that the absence of a party effect is not simply an artifact of weak parties in Africa, I analyze a global sample of leadership transitions from 1946-2008 and find that the presence of a ruling party does not increase the likelihood of a peaceful leadership transition. I also find that family ties also do not have a significant effect on the global sample of leadership changes. Appendix Table 8 reports these results.

Robustness Checks

My findings remain consistent over a number of other robustness checks. First, we may be concerned that regimes without constitutions are cases that are extremely personalist or have particularly weak institutions. To address this, I rerun the analysis on

²⁴ Because there are so few cases of hereditary succession in my sample, I exclude *Family ties* from the analysis. However, when included, this variable is never significant.

a subset of the data that excludes observations that do *not* have constitutions (in other words, only units that have constitutions for the entire period are included in this analysis). The results, reported in Appendix Table 9, remain consistent.

Second, we may be concerned that the binary measures of my independent variables are too coarse, and do not reflect differences in the levels of institutionalization of succession procedures. I rerun the analyses using count versions of my independent variables, rather than dummy variable versions. The count versions of the succession rule variables record the number of years the rule was in place, leading up to the transition. For consistency I also use count versions of the constitution and ruling party variables. The results, reported in Appendix Table 10, remain consistent with the main analyses.

Third, we may be concerned that my results are being driven purely by institutions that were created after the end of the Cold War. To address this concern, I rerun the analysis on leadership transitions that occurred prior to 1992. I do not include the Other rule in these regressions because the vast majority of designated successors was the vice president during this period. It is not surprising that the president of the legislature was rarely used for the designated successor during the Cold War, as authoritarian legislatures were much less influential (or sometimes even banned) during this period. The results, reported in Appendix Table 11, show that peaceful, constitutionally regulated successions in African regimes are not simply a post-Cold War trend. Even when we restrict the sample to only include transitions that occurred between 1960 and 1991, the presence of succession rules significantly increases the likelihood of peaceful transition.

Fourth, to address concerns about endogenous institutional creation, I run a set of models using *inherited* constitutional rules. As discussed earlier, since institutions are not assigned at random, the reader may be concerned that the relationship between constitutional rules and peaceful succession is endogenous. To deal with this concern, I consider cases where the leader *inherited* formal rules about succession, rather than creating them. I create new variable, ***Inherited succession rule***, which takes a value of 1 if the constitutional succession rule was already in place when the leader came into power.²⁵ Results from the analysis using inherited constitutional rules are reported in Appendix Table 12, and the results remain consistent.

Fifth, in order to account for the sequencing of transition events, I replicate my analysis using a Heckman selection model, rather than a logit model. This method is used for estimating regressions where the dependent variable is censored for a non-random portion of the data. In this case, we observe whether the incoming leader took power peacefully only if the incumbent left office peacefully. The Heckman model includes two equations: a selection equation focusing on selection into the sample of peaceful incumbent exit, and the main regression equation linking constitutional rules to the probability that the successor will come to power peacefully (i.e. that the transition will be coded as peaceful). The results from the Heckman selection model are reported in Appendix Table 13 and remain consistent with the main analysis.²⁶

²⁵ To maintain comparability, I drop founding presidents for this analysis because they do not have predecessors to inherit a constitution from.

²⁶ I do not report the results from the selection equation, since my earlier analysis already focused on explaining peaceful incumbent exit.

Designated Successors

Finally, I examine the conditions under which designated successors come to power. For this analysis, I focus my attention on examining the identity of the incoming leader for transitions that were peaceful, of which there are 33 cases. Although we have a limited number of observations in this subsample, the descriptive statistics establish a striking pattern: constitutional rules that identify the vice president as the designated successor are effective in bringing that person to power. Out of 33 peaceful transition cases, 23 regimes had a constitutional rule designating the vice president as the successor. 70 percent of the time, this rule worked: following the departure of the incumbent, the former vice president did successfully take power. Constitutional succession rules that identify someone *other* than the vice president as the successor are significantly less effective at bringing that person to power. Out of 33 peaceful transitions, there were 4 cases with the Other rule. In only one of those instances did the designated successor actually come into power. Appendix Table 14 provides cross tabs of successor outcomes and constitutional rules.

I also corroborate these empirical patterns using a logit model on the subsample of peaceful transition cases, reported in Table 4 (models 1 and 2).²⁷ For these regressions, I use *VP rule* as my primary independent variable, since there are such limited observations for *Other rule*. Since all peaceful transition cases have a constitution and a ruling party, I also exclude these variables from the regressions.

²⁷ The results remain consistent when using a Heckman selection model, rather than a logit model, as reported in Appendix Table 15.


Table 4: Did the designated successor come to power?

DV: Designated successor took power	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VP rule	2.906* (1.224)	20.788*** (5.736)	2.793* (1.254)	22.193*** (5.288)
Leader duration		0.052 (0.078)		0.059 (0.114)
GDP per capita		0.566 (0.331)		0.707 (0.403)
Oil production		-1.400** (0.513)		-1.536* (0.623)
Population		-1.258 (1.745)		-1.133 (1.472)
Ethnic frac		8.584 (17.347)		6.727 (15.946)
Cold War		0.703 (1.339)		0.786 (1.933)
British		-1.044 (2.079)		-1.934 (2.572)
French		18.631*** (4.311)		19.865*** (4.615)
Constant	-2.079 (1.105)	-16.883 (8.770)	-1.946 (1.120)	-18.166 (11.870)
Observations	32	30	28	26
Pseudo R2	0.219	0.534	0.212	0.588

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Logistic regressions used for all models, conditional on the transition being peaceful. Models (3) and (4) only include cases in which the designated successor was appointed for 3 or more years. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

The regression results verify that the designated successor is significantly more likely to come to power when the regime has a constitutional rule identifying the vice president as the designated successor. This relationship holds, even for a limited number of observations and when controlling for country- and regime-level characteristics. The magnitude of the effect is quite large: having a constitutional VP rule increases the probability that the designated successor will come into power by 59 percent (Figure 5).²⁸

²⁸ Marginal effect calculated using Model (2) in Table 4.



A critical aspect of my theory is that material resources allow designated successors who are VPs to consolidate their authority before the transition. Therefore we may be concerned that designated successors who were VP for only a very short period of time may not have been able to shore up their support base sufficiently prior to the transition. To address this, I rerun the analysis but only include cases where the designated successor was appointed for 3 or more years. The results, reported in Table 4 (models 3 and 4), remain consistent.

There are a small number of instances where the leadership transition was peaceful, but the new leader was not the designated successor. How did the incoming leader manage to take office peacefully, despite not being the heir apparent? Although there are a limited number of observations, some patterns emerge. First, these cases were often instances where someone other than the designated successor had a better or stronger claim. In Gabon and Togo, for instance, the outgoing leader's son took power as the new leader, despite not being the constitutional successor during their fathers' rule. In Angola, Gabon, and Mozambique, the Minister of Defense succeeded the outgoing incumbent, rather than the designated successor. The defense minister wields

considerable power: they have control over the appointment, management, and mobilization of all security forces in the regime. Furthermore, in Angola and Mozambique, the Minister of Defense were often war heroes from the liberation struggle. Second, these cases are instances where the regime had some other institutional mechanism to resolve succession conflict peacefully, such as uniquely strong ruling parties in Mozambique and Tanzania. However, these cases remain outliers, and the predominant way in which peaceful transitions occur is when the designated successor takes power.

Altogether, the data show that while a wide range of succession planning can help incumbents deter coup threats, only constitutional succession rules designating the vice president as the official successor are effective in bringing that person to power. The findings demonstrate that it is not sufficient to simply *have* succession rules – it matters whether the rule *empowers* the designated successor, allowing them to ascend to the presidency peacefully. This is a critical but overlooked component of leadership transitions.

6. Conclusion

This article examined the conditions under which peaceful leadership successions can occur in autocracies. I argued that constitutional rules play a critical role in regulating leadership transitions by solving dual problems of peaceful incumbent exit and peaceful successor entry. Constitutional succession rules – particularly those that appoint a designated successor – allow incumbents to exit power peacefully by reducing external coup threats. Ensuring that the incoming leader successfully takes power is a much taller

order, and constitutional rules are especially effective when they appoint the vice president as the designated successor. The vice president's access to material resources deters other factions from challenging the succession procedure, enabling peaceful exit and entry, whereas designating successors without a power base is ineffective.

I show evidence of my theory using original data on constitutional rules and the appointment of designated successors in 46 African countries from 1960 to 2010. While all constitutional succession rules prevent incumbents from being deposed, I find that only the VP rule significantly increased the probability of a peaceful transition. I show further evidence that this is due to the fact that designated successors under the VP rule are significantly more likely to ascend to the presidency. By contrast, when elites challenge the line of succession, conflict over the transition is likely to emerge, even if the outgoing leader died peacefully.

These findings provide an important corrective to existing perceptions of African politics. As a region, Africa constitutes a "hard case" for theories of constitutional rules. Scholars have historically argued that authoritarian regimes in Africa were dominated by "big men" and weak institutions (Decalo 1976, Jackson and Rosberg 1982). More recent work examining constitutional constraints and the introduction of multiparty elections in Africa have taken institutions more seriously (Dionne and Dulani 2012, Posner and Young 2007). However, these studies remain skeptical of the effectiveness of constitutional rules in prior decades, before the end of the Cold War. By contrast, I show that constitutions in African dictatorships are not uniformly weak and leadership transitions have not always been violent or unregulated. Importantly, these are not simply

post-Cold War trends. Constitutions matter, and this is true *even during the most authoritarian decades in Sub-Saharan Africa*.

Although the theoretical arguments presented in this paper generalize beyond regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa, future studies can collect data on constitutional rules and the appointment of designated successors from other regions of the world. Although the literature on authoritarian regimes has focused extensively on the actions of leaders, there have been surprisingly few studies on the executive branch – particularly presidential cabinets. Similarly, studies of authoritarian institutions have only recently begun studying the effects of constitutions on autocratic stability. By further examining the content of autocratic constitutions, scholars can continue to understand the conditions under which institutions shape regime outcomes in dictatorships.

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Online Appendix

- Appendix Table 1: List of constitutional succession rules
- Appendix Table 2: Distribution of Designated Successors
- Appendix Table 3: List of leaders included in this study
- Appendix Table 4: Transition Outcomes and Constitutional Rules (cross-tabs)
- Appendix Table 5: Leader deposal, disaggregated by type (robustness check)
- Appendix Table 6: Ordinary Least Squares (robustness check)
- Appendix Table 7: Vague Succession Rules (robustness check)
- Appendix Table 8: Global Sample (robustness check)
- Appendix Table 9: Sample limited to observations with constitutions (robustness check)
- Appendix Table 10: Count variables (robustness check)
- Appendix Table 11: Cold War period (robustness check)
- Appendix Table 12: Inherited Succession Rules (robustness check)
- Appendix Table 13: Heckman selection model (robustness check)
- Appendix Table 14: Successor Outcomes and Constitutional Rules (cross-tabs)
- Appendix Table 15: Designated Successors: Heckman selection model (robustness check)

Appendix Table 1: Constitutional Succession Rules

Country	Year	Designated successor
Angola	1992-2009	President of National Assembly
	2010-2017	Vice President
Botswana	1969-2018	Vice President
Burkina Faso	1977-1980	Prime Minister
	1991-2014	President of Senate
Burundi	1981-1986	Vice President
	1992-1996	President of National Assembly
Cameroon	1962-1971	Vice President
	1972-1975	President of National Assembly
	1975-1995	Prime Minister
CAR	1986-2002	President of National Assembly
	2005-2013	President of National Assembly
Comoros	1985-1992	President of Supreme Court
	2001-2010	Vice President
Republic of Congo	1961-1963	Vice President
DRC	2003-2019	President of Senate
Cote d'Ivoire	1976-1981	President of National Assembly
	1982-1985	Vice President
	1986-1999	President of National Assembly
Equatorial Guinea	1968-1972	Vice President
Gabon	1961-1974	Vice President
Gambia	1997-2016	Vice President
Ghana	1969-1972	President (“Speaker”) of the National Assembly
Guinea	1990-2008	President of the National Assembly
Guinea-Bissau	1981-1996	Vice President
Kenya	1963-1978	Vice President
Liberia	1944-1979	Vice President
	1986-2003	Vice President
Mali	1974-1990	President of National Assembly
Mauritania	1991-2004	President of Senate
Mozambique	1990-2015	President of National Assembly
Namibia	1990-2015	Prime Minister
Niger	1989-2009	President of National Assembly
Nigeria	1963-1966	President of Senate
	1979-1984	Vice President
	1993-1998	Vice President
Rwanda	1961-1973	Vice President
	1991-1994	Secretary General of ruling party
Senegal	1960-1975	President of National Assembly
	1976-1980	Prime Minister
Sierra Leone	1978-1991	Vice President
South Africa	1994-2018	Vice President (“Deputy President”)
Sudan	1973-1985	Vice President

	1998-2019	Vice President
Tanzania	1977-2015	Vice President
Togo	1992-2004	President of National Assembly
Zambia	1964-1972	Vice President
	1973-1991	Secretary General of ruling party
	1991-2008	Vice President

Note: The constitutional succession rules listed in this table include only the time period that is reflected in the dataset. For example, the succession rules that were introduced in Angola in 2010 are still in place today, but they are listed as “ending” in 2017 in this table, because the leader observations for Angola end in 2017. Succession rules were introduced into the Liberian constitution in 1847, but the rule is listed as “beginning” in 1944 in this table because that’s when the leader enters this dataset (earlier leaders are not included).

Appendix Table 2: Distribution of Designated Successors

Designated Successor	Country-Year Observations
Vice President/Prime Minister	409 (61%)
President of National Assembly	175 (26%)
President of Senate	55 (8%)
Other	28 (5%)
Total	667

Note: "Other" includes President of Supreme Court and Secretary General of ruling party

Appendix Table 3: List of leaders included in this study

Country	Leader name	Years in power
Angola	Antonio Agostinho Neto	1975-1979
Angola	Jose Eduardo dos Santos	1979-2017
Benin	Hubert Maga	1960-1963
Botswana	Seretse Khama	1966-1980
Botswana	Quett Masire	1980-1998
Botswana	Festus Mogae	1998-2008
Botswana	Seretse Khama Ian Khama	2008-2018
Burkina Faso	Maurice Yameogo	1960-1966
Burkina Faso	Sangoule Lamizana	1966-1980
Burkina Faso	Thomas Sankara	1983-1987
Burkina Faso	Blaise Compaore	1987-2014
Burundi	Michel Micombero	1966-1976
Burundi	Jean-Baptiste Bagaza	1976-1987
Burundi	Pierre Buyoya	1987-1993
Burundi	Pierre Buyoya	1996-2003
Cameroon	Ahmadou Ahidjo	1960-1982
CAR	David Dacko	1960-1966
CAR	Jean-Bedel Bokassa	1966-1979
CAR	Andre Kolingba	1981-1993
CAR	Ange-Felix Patasse	1993-2003
CAR	Francois Bozize	2003-2013
Chad	Francois Tombalbaye	1960-1975
Chad	Felix Malloum	1975-1979
Chad	Goukouni Oueddei	1979-1982
Chad	Hissene Habre	1982-1990
Comoros	Said Mohamed Djohar	1990-1995
Comoros	Assoumani Azali	1999-2006
Comoros	Ahmed Abdallah Sambi	2006-2011
Congo DRC	Joseph Kasavubu	1960-1965
Congo DRC	Mobutu Banga	1965-1997
Congo DRC	Laurent-Desire Kabila	1997-2001
Congo DRC	Joseph Kabila	2001-2019
Republic of Congo	Abbe Fulbert Youlou	1960-1963
Republic of Congo	Alphonse Massamba-Debat	1963-1968
Republic of Congo	Marien Ngouabi	1969-1977
Republic of Congo	Denis Sassou-Nguesso	1979-1992
Republic of Congo	Pascal Lissouba	1992-1997
Cote d'Ivoire	Felix Houphouet-Boigny	1960-1993
Cote d'Ivoire	Henri Konan Bedie	1993-1999
Cote d'Ivoire	Laurent Gbagbo	2000-2011
Djibouti	Hassan Gouled Aptidon	1977-1999
Equatorial Guinea	Francisco Macias Nguema	1968-1979
Ethiopia	Tafari Bante	1974-1977

Ethiopia	Mengistu Haile Mariam	1977-1991
Ethiopia	Meles Zenawi	1991-2012
Gabon	Leon M'Ba	1961-1967
Gabon	El Hadj Omar Bongo	1967-1967
Gambia	Dawda Jawara	1970-1994
Gambia	Yahya Jammeh	1996-2017
Ghana	Kwame Nkrumah	1960-1966
Ghana	J.A. Ankrach	1966-1969
Ghana	I.K. Acheampong	1972-1978
Guinea	Ahmed Sekou Toure	1958-1984
Guinea	Lansana Conte	1984-2008
Guinea Bissau	Luis De Almeida Cabral	1973-1980
Guinea Bissau	Joao Bernardo Vieira	1980-1999
Guinea Bissau	Kumba Yala	2000-2003
Guinea Bissau	Joao Bernardo Vieira	2005-2009
Kenya	Jomo Kenyatta	1963-1978
Liberia	William Tubman	1944-1971
Liberia	William Tolbert	1971-1980
Liberia	Samuel Doe	1980-1990
Liberia	Amos Sawyer	1990-1994
Liberia	Charles Taylor	1997-2003
Madagascar	Philibert Tsiranana	1959-1972
Madagascar	Gabriel Ramanantsoa	1972-1975
Mali	Modibo Keita	1960-1968
Mali	Moussa Traore	1968-1991
Mauritania	Moktar Ould Daddah	1960-1978
Mauritania	Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla	1980-1984
Mauritania	Maawiya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya	1984-2005
Mozambique	Samora Moises Machel	1975-1986
Mozambique	Joaquim Alberto Chissano	1986-2005
Mozambique	Armando Emilio Guebuza	2005-2015
Namibia	Samuel Daniel Nujoma	1990-2005
Namibia	Hifikepunye Pohamba	2005-2015
Niger	Hamani Diori	1960-1974
Niger	Seyni Kountche	1974-1987
Niger	Ali Saibou	1987-1993
Niger	Mahamane Ousmane	1993-1996
Niger	Ibrahim Bare Mainassara	1996-1999
Niger	Mamadou Tandja	1999-2010
Nigeria	Abubakah Tafawa Balewa	1960-1966
Nigeria	Yakubu Gowon	1966-1975
Nigeria	Olusegun Obasanjo	1976-1979
Nigeria	Alhaji Shehu Shagari	1979-1983
Nigeria	Ibrahim Babangida	1985-1993
Nigeria	Sani Abacha	1993-1998
Rwanda	Gregoire Kayibanda	1962-1973

Rwanda	Juvenal Habyarimana	1973-1994
Rwanda	Pasteur Bizimungu	1994-2000
Senegal	Leopold-Sedar Senghor	1960-1980
Sierra Leone	Milton Margai	1958-1964
Sierra Leone	Albert Michael Margai	1964-1967
Sierra Leone	Siaka Probyn Stevens	1968-1985
Sierra Leone	Joseph Saidu Momoh	1985-1992
Sierra Leone	Valentine Strasser	1992-1996
Somalia	Aden Abdullah Osman	1960-1967
Somalia	Mohamed Siad Barre	1969-1991
South Africa	Nelson Rolihla Mandela	1994-1999
South Africa	Thabo Mbeki	1999-2008
South Africa	Jacob Zuma	2009-2018
Sudan	Ibrahim Abboud	1958-1964
Sudan	Ismail Al-Azhari	1965-1969
Sudan	Gaafar Mohamed Nimeiry	1971-1985
Sudan	Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir	1989-2019
Tanzania	Julius Kambarage Nyerere	1963-1985
Tanzania	Ali Hassan Mwinyi	1985-1995
Tanzania	Benjamin William Mkapa	1995-2005
Tanzania	Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete	2005-2015
Togo	Sylvanus Olympio	1960-1963
Togo	Nicolas Grunitzky	1963-1967
Togo	Gnassingbe Eyadema	1967-2005
Uganda	Milton Obote	1962-1971
Uganda	Idi Amin	1971-1979
Uganda	Milton Obote	1980-1985
Zambia	Kenneth David Kaunda	1964-1991
Zambia	Frederick Chiluba	1991-2002
Zambia	Levy Patrick Mwanawasa	2002-2008
Zimbabwe	Robert Mugabe	1980-2017

Appendix Table 4: Transition Outcomes and Constitutional Rules

	VP rule	Other rule	No rule	Total
Transition Peaceful	23 (70%)	4 (12%)	6 (18%)	33
Transition Not Peaceful	13 (15%)	13 (15%)	60 (70%)	86
Total	36	17	86	119

Note: Percentage of outcomes with that particular institution presented in parentheses under the count. For example, 70 percent of peaceful transitions had a VP rule.

Appendix Table 5: Leader deposal, disaggregated by type (robustness check)

DV: Incumbent deposed	(1) Coup	(2) External challenge	(3) Coup	(4) External challenge	(5) Coup	(6) External challenge
Succession rule	-1.769*** (0.493)	-1.929** (0.589)	-1.568** (0.530)	-1.871** (0.629)	-1.073* (0.535)	-0.981 (0.852)
Constitution			0.355 (1.167)	1.779 (1.557)	0.059 (1.141)	1.315 (1.447)
Ruling party			-1.676 (1.223)	-3.127** (1.048)	-1.446 (1.340)	-3.498** (1.154)
Leader duration			-0.053 (0.029)	-0.005 (0.033)	-0.056 (0.034)	0.005 (0.039)
GDP per capita					-0.370* (0.166)	-2.444** (0.902)
Oil production					-0.479* (0.200)	1.052** (0.392)
Population					-0.198 (0.178)	-0.427 (0.227)
Ethnic frac					0.342 (1.272)	-1.422 (1.848)
British					0.054 (0.690)	-0.361 (0.827)
French					0.725 (0.653)	-0.065 (0.949)
Constant	0.750** (0.280)	-0.268 (0.394)	2.522 (1.488)	0.883 (1.885)	4.230 (2.518)	8.111* (3.332)
Observations	119	119	119	119	114	114
Pseudo R2	-1.769***	-1.929**	-1.568**	-1.871**	-1.073*	-0.981

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Multinomial logit used in all models. "External challenge" consists of popular uprisings and removal by rebel group. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Appendix Table 6: Ordinary Least Squares (robustness check)

DV: Transition peaceful	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Succession rule	0.419*** (0.098)		0.377*** (0.100)		0.267** (0.088)	
VP rule		0.548*** (0.106)		0.513*** (0.117)		0.370** (0.134)
Other rule		0.144 (0.128)		0.065 (0.109)		0.084 (0.137)
Constitution			-0.067 (0.114)	-0.057 (0.114)	-0.043 (0.126)	-0.084 (0.129)
Ruling party			0.064 (0.095)	0.037 (0.091)	0.042 (0.075)	0.042 (0.072)
Leader duration			0.010 (0.006)	0.012* (0.005)	0.009 (0.005)	0.010 (0.005)
GDP per capita					0.108*** (0.022)	0.098*** (0.025)
Oil production					-0.019 (0.027)	-0.026 (0.027)
Population					0.022 (0.039)	0.036 (0.039)
Ethnic frac					0.163 (0.126)	0.169 (0.126)
Cold War					0.093 (0.072)	0.046 (0.078)
British					-0.111 (0.166)	-0.149 (0.163)
French					-0.157 (0.121)	-0.097 (0.155)
Constant	0.091* (0.037)	0.091* (0.037)	-0.001 (0.136)	-0.010 (0.140)	-0.364 (0.408)	-0.429 (0.403)
Observations	119	119	119	119	114	114
R-Squared	0.216	0.295	0.255	0.350	0.462	0.489

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. OLS regression used in all models.
 *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Appendix Table 7: Vague Succession Rules (robustness check)

DV: Transition peaceful	(1)	(2)
Succession rule	4.197* (1.886)	3.627^ (2.176)
Vague succession rule	2.809 (1.867)	2.657 (2.129)
Constitution	-2.241 (1.750)	-2.113 (1.798)
Ruling party	1.202 (0.972)	0.020 (0.718)
Leader duration	0.045 (0.029)	0.071 (0.049)
GDP per capita		1.885* (0.783)
Oil production		-1.031 (0.581)
Population		0.476 (0.449)
Ethnic frac		2.738 (2.358)
Cold War		0.653 (0.646)
British		-1.459 (1.208)
French		-1.786 (1.031)
Constant	-3.717** (1.183)	-10.424* (4.233)
Observations	119	114
Pseudo R2	0.279	0.514

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Logistic regression used in all models.

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^p<0.10

Appendix Table 8: Global Sample

DV: Transition peaceful	(1)	(2)	(3)
Ruling party	0.008 (0.020)	0.011 (0.020)	-0.027 (0.044)
Family ties	0.778 (0.560)	0.824 (0.535)	1.811 (0.969)
Constant	-2.936*** (0.720)	-3.130*** (0.675)	-3.147** (1.183)
Observations	456	456	347
Pseudo R-squared	0.0613	0.0946	0.148
Country FE	No	No	Yes
Region controls	No	Yes	No

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Logistic regression used in all models. This global sample includes all authoritarian regimes from 1946-2008 (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010). *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Appendix Table 9: Sample limited to observations with constitutions (robustness check)

DV: Transition peaceful	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Succession rule	2.399*** (0.525)		1.759** (0.629)	
VP rule		2.931*** (0.605)		2.270** (0.843)
Other rule		1.182 (0.707)		0.957 (0.977)
Leader duration			0.081 (0.051)	0.089 (0.058)
GDP per capita			2.135 (1.096)	2.222 (1.267)
Oil production			-1.128 (0.776)	-1.251 (0.940)
Population			0.358 (0.387)	0.484 (0.404)
Ethnic frac			3.252 (2.529)	3.209 (2.551)
Cold War			0.385 (0.627)	0.172 (0.648)
British			-1.395 (1.056)	-1.790 (1.066)
French			-2.295* (1.064)	-1.983 (1.200)
Constant	-2.361*** (0.488)	-2.361*** (0.488)	-10.136* (4.124)	-11.313* (4.850)
Observations	111	111	106	106
Pseudo R2	0.194	0.252	0.526	0.539

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
 Logistic regression used in all models. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Appendix Table 10: Count variables (robustness check)

DV: Transition peaceful	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Succession rule	0.126*** (0.023)		0.107** (0.042)	
VP rule		0.177*** (0.041)		0.195** (0.066)
Other rule		0.053 (0.042)		0.066 (0.066)
Constitution			0.068 (0.055)	0.049 (0.057)
Ruling party			-0.017 (0.024)	-0.032 (0.020)
Leader duration			0.088 (0.046)	0.114* (0.052)
GDP per capita			1.814*** (0.547)	1.725** (0.543)
Oil production			-0.790* (0.359)	-0.739* (0.348)
Population			0.186 (0.353)	0.377 (0.499)
Ethnic frac			3.684 (3.471)	2.773 (3.269)
Cold War			2.508** (0.827)	2.122* (0.859)
British			-1.572 (1.415)	-2.644* (1.305)
French			-1.627 (1.179)	-1.527 (1.225)
Constant	-2.038*** (0.333)	-2.048*** (0.336)	-10.981** (3.364)	-11.322** (3.850)
Observations	119	119	114	114
Pseudo R2	0.252	0.310	0.550	0.575

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Logistic regression used in all models. Count version of variables used for succession rules (including VP rule and Other rule), constitution, and ruling party.

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Appendix Table 11: Cold War period (robustness check)

DV: Transition peaceful	(1)	(2)
VP rule	2.973*** (0.766)	2.677* (1.183)
Constitution		-3.335 (1.969)
Ruling party		0.560 (0.818)
Leader duration		0.235*** (0.055)
GDP per capita		2.393 (1.291)
Oil production		-0.965 (1.058)
Population		0.593 (0.587)
Ethnic frac		1.729 (2.440)
British		-3.587 (1.900)
French		-2.469 (1.577)
Constant	-2.686*** (0.616)	-9.747 (6.412)
Observations	61	60
Pseudo R2	0.280	0.523

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Logistic regression used in all models.

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Appendix Table 12: Inherited Succession Rules (robustness check)

DV: Transition peaceful	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Inherited succession rule	2.662** (0.848)		2.747** (0.988)	
Inherited VP rule		3.429*** (0.963)		3.018^ (1.554)
Inherited Other rule		0.657 (1.316)		2.183^ (1.275)
Constitution			-1.163 (1.663)	-1.343 (2.047)
Ruling party			-0.951 (0.822)	-0.843 (0.660)
Leader duration			0.151* (0.064)	0.144* (0.063)
GDP per capita			0.923 (0.695)	0.940 (0.699)
Oil production			-0.861 (0.770)	-0.871 (0.776)
Population			0.278 (0.364)	0.338 (0.362)
Ethnic frac			1.049 (2.082)	0.753 (2.259)
Cold War			-0.668 (1.445)	-0.712 (1.518)
British			0.282 (1.296)	0.119 (1.449)
French			-1.173 (1.047)	-0.972 (1.330)
Constant	-2.043*** (0.409)	-2.043*** (0.409)	-6.152 (4.901)	-6.307 (4.505)
Observations	81	81	79	79
Pseudo R2	0.234	0.299	0.523	0.525

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
 Logistic regression used in all models. Founding presidents dropped
 because they do not have predecessors to inherit a constitution from.
 *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^p<0.10

Appendix Table 13: Heckman selection model (robustness check)

DV: Transition peaceful	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Succession rule	1.105** (0.399)		1.405^ (0.757)	
VP rule		1.475*** (0.415)		4.676* (1.971)
Other Rule		0.291 (0.546)		1.100 (1.223)
Leader duration			0.032 (0.029)	0.084 (0.050)
GDP per capita			2.914** (0.981)	3.691** (1.402)
Oil production			-2.277** (0.815)	-3.267* (1.344)
Population			0.570* (0.288)	1.298* (0.535)
Ethnic frac			1.635 (2.594)	-2.622 (2.590)
Cold War			2.092*** (0.615)	3.652* (1.718)
British			-1.881* (0.858)	-3.527** (1.306)
French			-1.567 (0.947)	-1.443 (1.203)
Constant	-0.431 (0.363)	-0.431 (2.268)	-9.644** (3.208)	-15.547** (5.681)
Observations	119	119	116	116

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.
 Heckman selection model (Stata “*heckprob*”) used in all models.
 *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^p<0.10

Appendix Table 14: Successor Outcomes and Constitutional Rules

	Designated successor took power	Designated successor did not take power	Total
VP rule	16 (70%)	7 (30%)	23
Other rule	1 (25%)	3 (75%)	4
None	0	6	6
Total	17	16	33

Note: Only transitions that were coded as peaceful are included in this sample. Success rate of each rule is reported as a percentage under the count.

Appendix Table 15: Designated Successor: Heckman selection model (robustness check)

DV: Designated successor take power	(1)	(2)
VP rule	1.733** (0.650)	8.148** (2.614)
Leader duration		0.033 (0.048)
GDP per capita		0.329* (0.168)
Oil production		-0.790** (0.261)
Population		-0.740 (0.848)
Ethnic frac		4.705 (8.648)
Cold War		0.382 (0.778)
British		-0.498 (0.959)
French		6.917** (2.131)
Constant	-.674 (.660)	-5.717 (4.476)
Observations	119	117

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Heckman selection model (Stata “*heckprob*”) used.

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05